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The Public-Use Question
as a Takings Problem
Nicole Stelle Garnett*
Introduction
In 1998, Gateway International Motorsports Corporation ("Gateway")
approached its neighbor, National City Environmental ("National City"),
about purchasing a parcel of land for a parking lot. National City refused to
discuss the matter. Rather than attempting further negotiations, Gateway
filed a "Quick-Take Application Packet," asking the Southwestern Illinois
Development Authority ("Development Authority") to condemn the land
for Gateway in exchange for a commission. National City countered that
such a condemnation was inconsistent with the Takings Clauses of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions.' The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The
court accepted that the stated justification for the condemnation, i.e., the pro-
motion of economic development, was a "public" one. It reasoned, neverthe-
less, that the means by which the Development Authority sought to advance
that goal-to "advertise that, for a fee, it would condemn land at the request
of 'private developers' for the 'private use' of developers"-exceeded the
state and federal constitutional limits on the eminent-domain power.2
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environ-
mental3 is not the only recent decision setting aside an exercise of eminent
domain as inconsistent with the "public use" limitation on the takings power.
In September 2002, in Daniels v. Area Plan Commission,4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invalidated a county planning com-
mission's decision to vacate a restrictive covenant in order to make way for a
shopping center. The court reasoned that the taking ran afoul of the Fifth
Amendment's public-use limitation because the stated justification for the
action-again, the promotion of economic development-was "conclusory
and largely unsupported."5 And, in 2001, a federal district court similarly
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School. © Nicole Stelle Garnett. I thank Bob
Ellickson, Richard Garnett, Bill Kelley, Tom Merrill, John Nagle, Steven Smith, and Julian Ve-
lasco for helpful comments and suggestions and Christopher Keegan, Bruce Khula, and Claire
McKenna for valuable research assistance.
I See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 ("Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.").
2 See Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (11. 2002). The
opinion reversed an earlier decision upholding the condemnation. Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth.
v. Nat'l City Envtl., No. 87809, 2001 Il1. LEXIS 478 (I11. Apr. 19, 2001), vacated and reh'g
granted, 748 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. 2001).
3 Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1.
4 Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002).
5 Id. at 463-64.
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rejected a local government's effort to use eminent domain to accommodate
the Costco Wholesale Corporation's expansion demands. 6
The facts of these cases are unremarkable. Government officials regu-
larly use the power of eminent domain to benefit private entities, and just as
regularly justify their actions with assertions about the need to promote "eco-
nomic development. ' 7 Rather, the remarkable thing about these cases is that
the courts questioned the government's right to do so. In Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff,8 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
Fifth Amendment demands broad deference to a government's decision to
exercise the power of eminent domain.9 Midkiff makes clear that "public
6 See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003). Interest-
ingly, in an unrelated case, another federal district court held that condemning a church at
Costco's request violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc (2000). See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Costco's involvement in both cases may have been more than
coincidental. A property-rights group has collected news reports and filings which suggest that
Costco regularly demands eminent-domain services from local governments. See Ramesh Pon-
nuru, This Land Is Costco's Land: Cities Steal Land and Give it to Costco, NAT'L REV. ONLINE,
Feb. 18, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/ponnuru/ponnuru021803.asp.
7 For example, for the past several years, the city of Pittsburgh has pursued on-again-off-
again plans to condemn over one hundred small businesses in an effort to transform an ailing
downtown into a vibrant retail center. See Bill Steigerwald, Death by Wrecking Ball: Pittsburgh
and the Politics of Eminent Domain, REASON MAG., June 2000, at 30. When proposed, the plan
drew screams of protest from the businesses slated for condemnation. Arguing that the "Fifth
and Forbes" development was the last best hope for urban renewal, however, the city stuck to its
guns-right up to the moment that one of the major "anchor" retailers withdrew from the pro-
ject. At that point, the plan folded. See, e.g., Tom Barnes, Fifth-Forbes Foes Express Relief in
Party Atmosphere, PIT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 2000, at A13. In recent months, however, the
city has floated the plan again and has refused to rule out the possible use of eminent domain.
See, e.g., Tom Barnes, Fifth and Forbes: Fears of Eminent Domain Bring D.C. Law Firm Back,
Prrr. POST-GAZETTE, March 9, 2002, at C5. Other state and local governments have, in the
name of "economic development," condemned homes and businesses to make way for law firms,
auto race tracks, industrial plants, stadiums, shopping centers, wholesale stores, and casinos.
See, e.g., Laramore v. I11. Sports Facilities Auth., No. 89 C 1067, 1996 WL 153672 (N.D. I11. Apr.
1, 1996) (stadium); City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443
(Ind. 2001) (displacement of church); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't, 962 P.2d 543, 553
(Kan. 1998) (auto race track); City of Springfield v. Dreison Invs., Inc., Nos. 19991318, 991230,
000014, 2000 WL 782971 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2000) (stadium); Detroit/Wayne County Sta-
dium Auth. v. 7631 Lewiston, Inc., 601 N.W.2d 879 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (same); Casino Rein-
vestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (limousine holding
lot for Trump casino); City of Chattanooga v. Classic Refinery, Inc., No. 03A01-9712-CV-00552,
1998 WL 881862 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998) (same); In re The Westlake Project, 638 P.2d 549
(Wash. 1981) (retail shopping center); David Firestone, Black Families Resist Mississippi Land
Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at A20 (Nissan assembly plant); Rick Thackeray, Proposed
Hummer Plant Raises Eminent Domain Questions, INDIANA LAW., Mar. 29, 2000, at 6 (AM Gen-
eral manufacturing facility). For a comprehensive, state-by-state examination of the use of emi-
nent domain to promote "economic development" in this way, see DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC
POWER, PRIVATE GAIN: A FIVE YEAR, STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (2003), available at www.castlecoalition.org/report/pdf/ED-report.pdf.
8 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
9 Id. at 241 (upholding Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1976, which authorized the use of
eminent domain to transfer fee simple title from lessor to lessee); see also, e.g., Thomas Merrill,
Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561, 1569 (1986) [hereinafter
The George Washington Law Review
use" challenges are subject to rational-basis review. That is, so long as a tak-
ing can be justified by some conceivable public purpose, it will be upheld.
Yet in each of the cases mentioned above, a court put the government to its
proof-requiring a demonstrated connection between the challenged taking
and the particular purpose used to justify it. In so doing, these courts refused
to allow the government to avail itself of the "conceivability" safety valve
provided by rational-basis review, a standard that requires approval of any
taking that might serve the public interest in some theoretically possible
way.10
In other words, these cases may have been wrongly decided. A central
conclusion of this Article, however, is that they were not wrongheaded. The
courts were justifiably frustrated with the Midkiff straightjacket and under-
went doctrinal contortions to escape it. This Article illustrates that the
courts' instincts were sound, and that Midkiff needs to be supplemented with
precisely the kind of means-ends scrutiny employed in these recent cases.
This conclusion proceeds from an analogy to a different kind of "takings"
claim. While the public-use limitation on the takings power has been widely
regarded as a dead letter, at least since Midkiff (notwithstanding the above-
mentioned surprises), standards for evaluating so-called "regulatory" takings
have evolved substantially." Importantly, after Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission12 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,13 the government may not de-
mand that a property owner cede title to property in exchange for regulatory
approval unless it establishes that the exaction demanded is "roughly propor-
tional" to the impact of the proposed development.1 4
Although these exactions cases did not overrule Midkiff,15 they may
have something important to say about the public-use problem. In both the
Merrill, Rent Seeking] (observing that "[t]he Supreme Court has largely abandoned the require-
ment that the power of eminent domain be devoted to public rather than private ends"); Cass
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 891 (1987) (noting that "it is said that the
public use requirement has been rendered effectively unenforceable, much like the rationality
requirement of the due process clause post-Lochner").
10 The standard rational-basis review formula, as set forth in Midkiff, requires only that
the government demonstrate that "the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally re-
lated to a conceivable public purpose." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. The Seventh Circuit explicitly
rejected the "conceivability" rule. See Daniels, 306 F.3d at 466 (rejecting the Commission's argu-
ment that "we should not just consider the actual purposes that were considered, but also any
'conceivable public purpose"').
I See generally, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazollo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
12 Nollan , 483 U.S. 825.
13 Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
14 See id. at 391 ("No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."); see also id. at 386; Nollan, 483 U.S. at
837.
15 The Court has expressed reservations about applying the Nollan/Dolan nexus require-
ment outside of the exactions context. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999) ("The rule applied in Dolan considers whether dedications de-
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eminent-domain and exactions contexts, the government seeks to acquire
property to advance a particular public policy. In both, it offers a property
owner something of value (either monetary compensation or regulatory ap-
proval) in exchange for his or her property. Yet, the Court's approach to
these two forms of land acquisition diverges sharply. In an exactions case,
the government must link the means by which property is acquired to the
ends for which it will be used; in an eminent-domain case, it need not. In-
deed, one prominent federal court of appeals judge has suggested that con-
siderable "tension" exists between the deference required in public-use cases
and the heightened scrutiny of exactions. 16 National City Environmental,
Daniels, and the 99 Cents Only case provide real-world evidence of this ten-
sion. Despite the fact that current law appears to preclude inquiry into
whether a compensated taking is calibrated to advance its asserted purpose, 17
each of these courts took pains to distinguish Midkiff so as to require the
government to establish a means-ends connection similar to that demanded
by Nollan and Dolan.
This Article examines whether this jurisprudential move should be for-
malized-that is, whether a version of the means-ends review required of
exactions should extend to public-use cases. I make no effort to argue that
Nollan and Dolan extend, as a matter of deductive logic, to the taking of
property by eminent .domain.18 Rather, I explore first whether the justifica-
tions for heightened means-ends scrutiny of exactions are present when the
government acquires land by eminent domain, and, second, what such scru-
tiny might look like in a public-use case.' 9
manded as conditions of development are proportional to the development's anticipated im-
pacts. It was not designed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different
questions arising where, as here, the landowner's challenge is based not on excessive exactions
but on denial of development.").
16 See Richardson v. City & County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1167 (9th Cir. 1997)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied sub nom. City & County of
Honolulu v. Small Landowners, 525 U.S. 871 (1998); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Harms
and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 491-92 (1995) ("Another point that
is not settled is whether this new judicial attitude or suspicious look will carry over to other
portions of the takings clause that don't involve compensation and police power regulation. So,
for example, does the Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff reading of the public-use require-
ment, which allows any conceivable justification the state can put forward, continue to apply? ...
I don't know whether Midkiff can survive Dolan, but I know that it should not.").
17 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). Of course, an errant court
occasionally departs from this total-deference rule, usually on state-law grounds. See Thomas W.
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 103-06 (1986) [hereinafter Mer-
rill, Economics of Public Use] (surveying successful state-court public-use cases).
18 The exactions cases address when a government must exercise its power of eminent
domain, rather than its police power, to acquire property. Obviously, this question does not
arise in a public-use case because the government has chosen to acquire land by eminent domain
and compensation is unquestionably required. The full impact of Nollan and Dolan remains the
subject of substantial debate. See generally, e.g., TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER Dolan and Lucas (David L. Callies ed., 1996); David A.
Dana, Land Use Regulations in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997);
James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings Back into the Fifth Amendment: Land
Use Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103 (1996).
19 In so doing, I take Nollan and Dolan as given and therefore assume that the theoretical
justifications for compensating some regulatory takings serve to explain the rule adopted to trig-
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines whether the compensa-
tion guaranteed when the government acquires land by eminent domain
eliminates the need for a legal rule mandating a relatively tight fit between
the means by which and the purpose for which land is acquired. In doing so,
the Article considers the most common theoretical justifications for compen-
sating some regulatory takings-efficiency and fairness.20 This analysis
reveals at least two separate reasons for relatively close scrutiny of a govern-
mental decision to acquire private property involuntarily, even when prop-
erty owners are compensated for their loss. First, monetary compensation
does not necessarily zero out what Frank Michelman famously termed the
"demoralization costs" associated with a taking.2 Indeed, given the potential
inadequacies of the constitutionally mandated fair-market-value "just com-
pensation" award, an owner who loses his property through an exercise of
eminent domain sometimes may be worse off than an owner asked to relin-
quish property rights as an exaction.22 Second, public-choice theory suggests
that the compensation requirement alone will not necessarily deter the gov-
ernment from overacquiring private property. On the contrary, the need for
a government to "compete" for development might constrain the use of exac-
tions but not the power of eminent domain. While the former discourages
development, the latter can be used to induce developers shopping for a new
location.23
Part II discusses how courts might conduct means-ends scrutiny of an
exercise of eminent domain. Means-ends scrutiny may seem odd to those
accustomed to the ends-oriented nature of the traditional public-use chal-
lenge. But, it is not difficult to conceive of a test that does in public-use cases
what Nollan and Dolan did in exactions cases-abandons rational-basis re-
view and require the government to link the means by which it acquires land
to the particular purpose (rather than a conceivable one) for the acquisition. 24
How might such review work? The government acquires land to advance
ger compensation in those cases. I recognize that many commentators take issue with Nollan
and Dolan. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 184 (1993) (noting
that "Nollan has received a rocky reception" in academic literature); see also infra notes 183-84
(citing representative sources on the academic debate surrounding Nollan and Dolan). I make
no attempt to justify those decisions here. Rather, I explore whether the legal rule adopted in
them is at least as justified in a public-use case as in an exaction case.
20 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998 (1999) ("In a vast and otherwise contentious literature ...
there appears to be virtual consensus that the purposes of just compensation are essentially
two[:] . . . 'utility' and 'fairness'. ... ").
21 See Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness]; see also infra text accompanying notes 69-109.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 105-09.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 141-70.
24 Rational-basis review is, of course, a form of means-ends scrutiny-if a toothless one.
The accepted wisdom is that Nollan was the first case to abandon this standard of scrutiny in the
land use context. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. For a classic criticism of the "con-
ceivability" test, see Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, Foreword to the Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19-20 (1972).
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public purposes in various ways: at times by using the power of eminent do-
main, at times by purchasing it on the market, and at other times (as Nollan
and Dolan illustrate) through exactions.25 Furthermore, not all condemna-
tions proceed in the same way; the government sometimes takes procedural
shortcuts when acquiring property that amplify the concerns raised by emi-
nent domain generally.26 Because the government has choices about how to
acquire property, a court might require it to demonstrate, as the Supreme
Court has with respect to exactions, that a given exercise of eminent domain
is "reasonably necessary" to advance or, put differently, "related in nature
and extent" to the public purpose used to justify it.27 The remainder of this
Article discusses how this test might play out in public-use cases.
L Eminent Domain as a "Means-Ends" Problem
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause (and like provisions of state
constitutions) provides that private property shall not be "taken for public
use, without just compensation. ' 28 The extent to which the reference to
"public use" creates a judicially enforceable limitation on the power of emi-
nent domain is the subject of a longstanding debate. That debate has tradi-
tionally focused upon whether courts should scrutinize the "publicness" of a
project enabled by the use of eminent domain, especially when the govern-
ment condemns land with the intention of transferring it to a private party.
29
The United States Supreme Court's answer to that question has, at least in
the past fifty years, been essentially once in a blue moon (maybe). 30 In
Berman v. Parker31 and again in Midkiff,32 the Court rejected the argument
25 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 286
(1990) [hereinafter Levmore, Just Compensation] ("Governmental projects often include some
actions that involve market participation of the familiar private sort, some that involve the
power of the state to take private property while compensating for its pre-taking value, and
some that draw on powers of the state ... to burden without compensation."). It is reasonable
to assume, in fact, that the government will use the power of eminent domain, only after resort-
ing to the market and failing. See infra text accompanying notes 221-22.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 228-305.
27 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1994) (describing federal standard for
review of exactions).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also 2A JULIus L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT Do-
MAIN § 7.01 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing public-use clauses in state constitutions and statutes).
29 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 162-81 (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS] (arguing that the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause was designed to enable the government to condemn land for public use,
not to seize land to advance the broadly defined "public interest"); Lawrence Berger, The Public
Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 205-25 (1978) (surveying develop-
ment of public-use tests); Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 61; Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 891 (describing historical and current interpretation of Public Use Clause); Note, The
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600-14
(1949) (surveying development of public-use doctrine in state and federal courts).
30 See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 891 (noting that the "public use requirement traditionally
meant that the property had actually to be used by the public. But gradually the requirement
was expanded to refer to any plausible public justification .... Thus it is said that the public use
requirement has been rendered effectively unenforceable .... ").
31 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In Berman, the Court considered a challenge to
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act, which authorized the use of eminent domain to
2003]
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that the "fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred
in the first instance to private beneficiaries ...condemn[s] that taking as
having only a private purpose. '33 Instead, the Court equated "public use"
and "public interest," and, as noted above, held that the government has vir-
tually unfettered discretion to exercise its power of eminent domain to ad-
vance any conceivable public purpose. 34 As Justice O'Connor observed for a
unanimous Court in Midkiff, "When the legislature's purpose is legitimate
and its means are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates
over the wisdom of takings-no less so than debates over the wisdom of
other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be carried out in the
federal courts." 35
In an influential work, Thomas Merrill argues that the refusal to con-
sider the "means" and "ends" of eminent domain separately goes a long way
toward explaining courts' traditional "hands off" approach to the public-use
question. He posits that courts are reluctant to second-guess a government's
assertion that a project enabled by eminent domain advances the public in-
terest because "[t]he answer to such questions demand an exercise in high
political theory that most courts today are unwilling (or unable) to under-
take. ' 36 As the Court observed in Midkiff, "[j]udicial deference is required
because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess
what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking
power. '37 Given this practical and philosophical limitation, Professor Merrill
has suggested that judicial review should instead focus on the means by which
the government chooses to acquire land, rather than the ends that the gov-
ernment seeks to advance by acquiring it.38 In Merrill's view, an analysis of
the "means question," which asks "where and how the government should
acquire and level much of southwest Washington, D.C. and transfer it to a private developer for
redevelopment. The plaintiff, who owned a department store slated for condemnation, chal-
lenged the law. Id. at 31. The Court rejected his argument that the Fifth Amendment precluded
the condemnation of property under these circumstances. Id. at 36. Nor did the Court require
the government to demonstrate that the use of eminent domain was a necessary or even wise
way to advance the goal of redevelopment, reasoning instead that "[o]nce the object is within the
authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to determine."
Id. at 33.
32 In Midkiff, the Court considered a "public use" challenge to a law which enabled the
Hawaii Housing Authority to condemn property occupied by tenants living on single-family resi-
dential lots and transfer the title in fee simple to the lessees. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 233 (1984). After quoting extensively from Berman, the Court concluded, "[t]he 'pub-
lic use' requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Id. at
240. Because it found that the law was supported by a conceivable public purpose-breaking up
a land oligopoly-the Court concluded that the law was constitutional. Id. at 241-42. And, as in
Berman, it refused to separately scrutinize the means that Hawaii had chosen to advance this
policy. Id. at 242-43.
33 Id. at 243-44.
34 Id. at 241 ("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by
the Public Use Clause.").
35 Id. at 242-43.
36 Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 67.
37 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
38 Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 67-68.
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get property, not what it may do with it ... demands a more narrowly fo-
cused and judicially manageable inquiry than the ends approach. 39
The Court's opinions in Nollan and Dolan adopted that very approach in
the exactions context. Nollan and Dolan both addressed the problem of reg-
ulatory "exactions" imposed in exchange for discretionary approval to de-
velop private property. Prior to these cases, federal judges and legal scholars
alike assumed that, as is currently the case with eminent domain, the power
to impose exactions was coterminous with the scope of the police power.
That is, the government was free to exact concessions from property owners
so long as the regulation was plausibly connected to some conceivable gov-
ernmental interest.40 After Nollan and Dolan, the government's police
power to regulate private property remains unquestioned. If the government
chooses to regulate via exactions, however, it must demonstrate a means-
ends connection between the exaction and the regulatory goal.
In Nollan, the Court held that the California Coastal Commission
("Commission") violated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause by condi-
tioning the approval of a building permit upon the property owners granting
an easement providing pubic access across their property to a public beach. 41
The Court accepted the Commission's assertion that "the public interest will
be served by a continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the
coast."'42 The Court nonetheless found that the exaction effected a taking
because the Commission failed to establish an "essential nexus" between the
condition demanded (an easement granting physical access to the beach) and
the policy used to justify it (the need to minimize the negative effects of con-
structing a new home that would obstruct the public's view of the ocean). 43
Several years later in Dolan, the Court resolved a question left open in
Nollan, namely, the degree of connection required between the exaction im-
posed by the regulatory agency and the policy justifying it.44 At issue in Do-
39 Id. at 67. The fact that both Berman and Midkiff were unanimous opinions provides
support for this hypothesis.
40 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
Court has made a serious error by abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality
and imposing a novel burden of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid comprehensive
land use plan."); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842-43 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) ("The Court's conclusion that the permit condition imposed on appellants is unreasona-
ble cannot withstand analysis. . . . [T]he Court demands a degree of exactitude that is
inconsistent with our standard for reviewing the rationality of a State's exercise of its police
power for the welfare of its citizens."); see also, e.g., Dana, supra note 18, at 1253-54 (noting that
prior to Nollan, "bottom-line dynamics of land use litigation" was that "[l]ocal governments
won, aggrieved property owners lost"); Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Anal-
ysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 591, 602 (1998) (observing that although
previous decisions claimed to apply "substantially advances" test, Nollan represented first depar-
ture from previous, rational-basis review of property regulations); Frank Michelman, Takings,
1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Takings] (noting that
"[p]rior to Nollan, a judicial determination of a property regulation's validity ... to the extent
that it involved any means-ends appraisal, involved only scrutiny of the public purposes plausibly
ascribed to the regulation").
41 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
42 Id. at 841.
43 Id. at 837.
44 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377.
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lan was the city of Tigard's decision to condition the approval of a permit to
expand an existing plumbing store on the store owner's dedication of approx-
imately ten percent of her property for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway and
storm drainage system.45 As in Nollan, the Court accepted that the ends of
the policy purportedly advanced by the dedication were valid.46 The Court
further found the "essential nexus" required by Nollan between the legiti-
mate policy and the permit condition.47 The Court nonetheless held that the
exaction violated the Takings Clause because the city had failed to establish
that the required dedication was "roughly proportional" to the impact of the
proposed development. 48
A. A Question of Compensation?
But what do Nollan and Dolan have to say about the public-use ques-
tion?49 An exercise of the power of eminent domain does not raise the un-
constitutional conditions problem at issue in the exactions cases:50 The
government is forcing a property owner to relinquish all rights of ownership
in exchange for compensation-not to barter them away for regulatory ap-
proval. 51 The very fact that the government unquestionably must pay for the
land it takes by eminent domain might sufficiently dispel a concern motivat-
ing the heightened scrutiny required in Nollan and Dolan, namely that the
45 Id. at 379-80.
46 Id. at 396.
47 Id. at 387.
48 Id. at 395-96.
49 The Court has expressed reservations about expanding the Nollan/Dolan nexus require-
ment to related constitutional questions, including other types of "regulatory takings" claims.
See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999) ("The rule
applied in Dolan considers whether dedications demanded as conditions of development are
proportional to the development's anticipated impacts. It was not designed to address, and is
not readily applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the landowner's
challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of development.").
50 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (noting that both cases applied the "well-settled doctrine of
'unconstitutional conditions"'); see also Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exac-
tions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991) (char-
acterizing the constitutional claim at issue in Nollan).
51 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning
the receipt of a public benefit, even a benefit to which the recipient is not entitled, upon the
surrender of a constitutional right. E.g., Been, supra note 50, at 474; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 5 (1993) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, BARGAINING] ("Stated in its ca-
nonical form, this doctrine holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny any
individual a privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improp-
erly 'coerce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of that person's constitutional rights."). For other
comprehensive treatments of the doctrine, see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989).
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government might abuse its bargaining position 52 and, impose exactions as
part of "an 'out-and-out plan of extortion." 53
On the other hand, if the Court's assertions are to be taken at face value,
Nollan and Dolan are both unconstitutional conditions cases and regulatory
takings cases. Further, the Court's opinions in Nollan and Dolan, as in all
regulatory takings cases, reflect the oft-stated principle that the Fifth Amend-
ment was designed "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole. '54 By requiring that an exaction be "related in both nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development, '55 the Court at-
tempted to ensure that the property owner would bear no more than his or
her "fair share" of the burden of regulation. Of course, a necessary corollary
to this principle is that the "public as a whole" bears the burdens imposed by
regulation by paying for them with tax dollars. As Justice Holmes observed
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,56 "[a] strong public interest or desire to
improve the public condition does not warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 57
The fact that compensation is guaranteed when the government acquires
land by eminent domain, however, does not totally eliminate the concerns
underlying either the unconstitutional conditions cases or the regulatory tak-
ings cases. First, most scholars agree that, broadly speaking, the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine seeks to minimize the opportunity for government
abuses of power.58 Yet, as the discussion below highlights, the power of emi-
nent domain can also be abused, inflicting harms at least as great as those that
animate Nollan and Dolan. Second, and relatedly, the fact that compensa-
tion is part-and-parcel to an exercise of eminent domain does not eliminate
the risk that a property owner may be forced to bear more than his or her
52 See Sullivan, supra note 51, at 1496-97 (arguing that conditioned benefits skew the dis-
tribution of power between government and rightholders).
53 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v.
Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981)).
54 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). For cases quoting Armstrong, see
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988); Nollan, 483 U.S. at
835-36 n.4; Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987); First Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 123-24 (1978); see also Glynn Lunney, Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 747 (1993) [hereinafter Lunney, Compensation for Takings] (noting that
Armstrong principle has become part of the "ritual litany" employed in takings cases); Thomas
W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV.
859, 880 n.100 (1995) [hereinafter Merrill, Rights as Public Goods] (observing that the statement
in Armstrong "has taken on the quality of a canonical recitation"). On Armstrong principle
generally, see William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997).
55 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
56 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
57 Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416; see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396 (quoting Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at
416).
58 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 51, at 23 (discretionary authority over bene-
fits "increases the risks of government misbehavior"); Sullivan, supra note 51, at 1492-93 (argu-
ing that unconstitutional conditions doctrine prevents government from "aggrandiz[ing] pubic
power").
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"fair share" of the burden of advancing the common good.5 9 An individual
forced to relinquish her property in an eminent-domain proceeding stands in
a very different position than the taxpayers who must pay to compensate her
for it.6 0 The government's decision to condemn property has little direct ef-
fect on any individual taxpayer; at most, he or she suffers a slightly higher tax
burden as a result. But the displaced property owner is vividly aware of the
consequences of the government's action; in the worst-case scenario she loses
her home, business, neighbors, and community.61
For the reasons identified by Frank Michelman in his groundbreaking
article over thirty years ago, 62 this difference in position strongly weighs in
favor of extending some form of heightened scrutiny to public-use cases.
Michelman influentially 63 identifies two purposes of compensation: "utility" 64
and "fairness. '65 The following discussion focuses on "demoralization costs,"
a factor which Michelman places into the former category,66 but which clearly
has implications for the latter as well.67 Michelman observes that one justifi-
cation for the compensation requirement is the need to avoid these "demor-
alization costs" suffered by property owners, their sympathizers, and other
observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to
similar treatment on some other occasion. ' 68 For a number of reasons, com-
pensation does not always eliminate these demoralization costs in the emi-
nent-domain context. 69
59 See infra text accompanying notes 71 and 86 (discussing risk of undercompensation).
60 See infra text accompanying notes 140-70 (discussing public choice implications of this
difference in position).
61 See, e.g., James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1305-06 (1985) (discussing the unique harms imposed by the forced loss
of home or business).
62 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 21.
63 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
141-42 (1995) [hereinafter FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS] ("[Michelman's article] has domi-
nated academic discussion of the takings issue for more than a quarter of a century."); Heller &
Krier, supra note 20, at 998 (noting that Michelman's article "remains, more than thirty years
after its publication, the most significant piece of academic commentary on [the] subject" of
takings).
64 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 21, at 1208.
65 Id. at 1218.
66 Id. at 1172-83; see also Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV.
741, 763 (1999) (characterizing "demoralization" analysis as Michelman's "utilitarian calculus");
FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 142 (same characterization).
67 See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279,
286 (1992) ("Michelman's theory is rooted in a psychology of takings; he seems to see the func-
tion of compensation awards to be as much therapeutic as economic.").
68 Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness, supra note 21, at 214. Later commentators
have categorized the "demoralization" equation as an "insurance theory" of takings, reasoning
that compensation serves to pool the costs associated with property owners' aversion to the risk
of an uncompensated taking. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation
for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569, 624 (1984).
69 See, e.g., Durham, supra note 61, at 1306 (arguing that "[s]pecific demoralization costs
appear to be greater for eminent domain than for other governmental actions").
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First, the measure of damages awarded in an eminent-domain proceed-
ing-namely, the fair market value of the property70-frequently fails to
make property owners "whole," especially with respect to subjective losses.71
Using Michelman's terms, the "settlement cost" associated with an exercise
of eminent domain (that is, the amount required to avoid demoralization
costs) 72 exceed the fair market value of the condemned property.73
The well-recounted tale of the psychological toll taken by America's ex-
periment with "urban renewal" provides a heart-wrenching illustration of the
human costs of forced displacements. The urban renewal phenomenon
emerged conceptually during the 1930s and 1940s among planning intellectu-
als convinced that virtually all of the largest American cities, as well as a
many smaller urban centers, were in a state of rapid deterioration. 74 City
planners and municipal leaders recognized urban problems in fundamentally
material, not sociological, terms. As such, they hoped to rectify the problem
of urban "blight" primarily through the wholesale destruction of existing
neighborhoods and the construction of grandiose new developments. 75
Beginning in the 1940's, the federal urban renewal program underwrote
the widespread exercise of eminent domain by local governments to con-
demn "blighted" areas and sell the properties to private investors at bargain-
70 See, e.g., United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 334 (1949) (condemnee entitled only to
fair market value); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (same).
71 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 29, at 183 ("The central difficulty of the market
value formula for explicit compensation . . . is that it denies any compensation for real but
subjective values."); see also, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736-37 (1973) (explaining that
market value formulation does not account for subjective loss); Merrill, Economics of Public
Use, supra note 17, at 83 (reviewing literature); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and
Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 890 (1989) [hereinafter
Schill, Intergovernmental Takings] ("In contrast to an indemnity approach, compensating only
transferable values seems to shift attention from what the condemnee has lost, to what the con-
demnor gains."). For additional discussions of the fair-market-value formula, see, for example,
W. Harold Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution: A Critical
View, 24 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1970); Durham, supra note 61; Lunney, Compensation for Takings,
supra note 54.
72 FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 146 (discussing application of settle-
ment costs); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 21, at 1214.
73 See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 29, at 183 (market value systematically underesti-
mates the use value to owner). Obviously, additional monetary compensation could zero out
these demoralization costs, leading some commentators to propose a bonus value award upon
condemnation. See id. at 184; Ellickson, supra note 71, at 736-37; see also infra text accompany-
ing note 86 (discussing compensation and the endowment effect).
74 On urban renewal, see generally, for example, BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B.
SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 15-37 (1989); CHARLES N.
GLAAB, A HISTORY OF URBAN AMERICA (3d ed. 1983); ZANE L. MILLER, THE URBANIZATION
OF MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY (1973); JON C. TEAFORD, THE ROUGH ROAD TO
RENAISSANCE: URBAN REVITALIZATION IN AMERICA, 1940-1985, at 44-80 (1990); URBAN RE-
NEWAL, THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
75 See, e.g., FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 16 (stating that planners believed that
the existing cities were obsolete and that "[t]o replace the obsolete city with this new vision
would mean tearing down much of what was there"); LEWIS MUMFORD, FROM THE GROUND UP
226-29 (1956) (arguing that clearance was the only solution to cities' problems); TEAFORD, supra
note 74, at 105 (characterizing the "eradication of slums" as the "ultimate dream of planners").
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basement prices.76 As a result, "city renewal directors were searching for the
'blight that's right'-places just bad enough to clear but good enough to at-
tract developers."'77 In their quest to eliminate "blight," officials razed homes
and displaced hundreds of thousands of families and tens of thousands of
businesses. Several hundred thousand more were displaced during the same
period to make way for the interstate highway system. 78
During the height of this period, Jane Jacobs colorfully observed that:
[Pleople who get marked with the planners' hex signs are pushed
about, expropriated, and uprooted much as if they were the subjects
of a conquering power. Thousands upon thousands of small busi-
nesses are destroyed, and their proprietors ruined, with hardly a
gesture at compensation. Whole communities are torn apart and
sown to the winds, with a reaping of cynicism, resentment and de-
spair that must be heard and seen to be believed....
Could Job have been thinking of Chicago when he wrote:
Here are the men that alter their neighbor's landmark...
shoulder the poor aside, conspire to oppress the friendless.
Reap they the field that is none of theirs, strip they the
vineyard wrongfully seized from its owner...
A cry goes up from the city streets, where wounded men
lie groaning ...
If so, he was also thinking of New York, Philadelphia, Boston,
Washington, St. Louis, San Francisco and a number of other places.
TI7he economic rationale of current city rebuilding is a hoax. The
economics of city rebuilding do not rest soundly on reasoned invest-
ment of public tax subsidies, as urban renewal theory proclaims, but
also on vast, involuntary subsidies wrung out of helpless site
victims. 7
9
Jacobs's words proved prophetic. Long-term studies of urban renewal
projects found that the forced displacements destroyed many close-knit ur-
ban communities and "created nothing less than a life crisis" for residents.80
As Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn have noted, "planners had a knack
for picking low-income neighborhoods where residents had deep attachments
to friends, relatives, neighbors, churches, schools, and local businesses." 81
One study of the long-term psychological effects of the residents displaced by
the demolition of Boston's West End in the late 1950s found that forty-six
76 TEAFORD, supra note 74, at 107 (noting that Federal Housing Act of 1949 provided aid
to local governments to purchase and clear blighted sites and transfer property to private devel-
opers for redevelopment). For an examination of the scope of the exercise of eminent-domain
powers during urban renewal, see Michael R. Klein, Eminent Domain: Judicial Response to the
Human Disruption, 46 J. URB. LAW 1, 7-8 (1968) (noting that 94 percent of all federally assisted
uses of eminent domain occurred in twenty years prior to publication of the article).
77 FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 23.
78 See id. at 29, 34 (noting that urban renewal displaced more than 400,000 families and
39,000 businesses while highway construction displaced an additional 330,000 families).
79 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIEs 5 (1961).
80 FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 34.
81 Id. at 33.
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percent of women and thirty-eight percent of men suffered "fairly severe
grief. '82 Displaced residents in Southwest Washington, D.C. (the renewal ef-
fort at issue in Berman) reported similar emotional losses. 83
Concern about this type of uncompensated subjective loss has lead both
Merrill and Margaret Radin to argue in favor of changing the eminent-do-
main ground rules when the risk of subjective loss is high. Merrill argues that
the courts should carefully scrutinize the decision to exercise the power of
eminent domain in such cases. 84 Radin has gone farther, arguing that "per-
sonal," as opposed to "fungible," property should be entitled to special pro-
tection from condemnation.8 5 Experimental evidence stemming from the
groundbreaking work of cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, however, suggests that the subjective valuation problem ex-
ists with every exercise of eminent domain because possession alone in-
creases the value attached to all property, and not simply that which Radin
would characterize as "fungible. ' '86 The presence of such an "endowment
effect" is well documented by experiments demonstrating that individuals
consistently demand more to part with an entitlement than they would be
willing to pay to acquire it in the first instance. 87 This "offer/ask" disparity88
has led experimental economists to advocate above-market compensation
whenever property is acquired through eminent domain.89
82 Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URBAN
RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 360 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966). On
date of relocations, see FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 34. See generally HERBERT J.
GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS: GROUP AND CLASS IN THE LIFE OF ITALIAN-AMERICANS (1962)
(case study of the West End).
83 DANIEL THURSZ, WHERE ARE THEY Now 100-01 (1966).
84 See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 84.
85 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 1005-06
(1982) (suggesting that "personhood perspective" of property might lead to an implied limitation
on government's eminent-domain power to condemn private homes); see also Margaret Jane
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1686-87 (1988) (proposing partial market inalienability for some forms of
property).
86 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 35-38 (1989) (noting that
the "Tversky-Kahneman analysis predicts that an ordinary landowner would feel the loss of a
psychologically vested right.., more keenly than he would the loss of a prospect (a psychologi-
cally unvested right) of identical market value"). Daniel Kahneman received the 2002 Nobel
Prize in Economics for his work with Tversky (who died in 1996). See All Too Human, ECONO-
MIST, Oct. 10, 2002, at 74. Kahneman shared the prize with Vernon Smith, who pioneered the
field of experimental economics. Id.
87 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness:
An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
259 (1993) (reviewing literature); Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Com-
pensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of Value,
99 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1984).
88 See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 207.
89 See JACK L. KNETSCH, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION: COMPULSORY ACQUISI-
TION AND OTHER LOSSES 49-53 (1983); Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas Borcherding, Expropriation
of Private Property and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U. TORONTO L.J. 237, 246-49 (1979); see
also FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 207-08 (reviewing literature).
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Nor is the risk of undercompensation limited to psychological losses. On
the contrary, the fair-market-value award may also fail to make displaced
property owners whole with respect to relocation expenses, good will associ-
ated with a business's physical location, or, importantly, the cost of replacing
the condemned property.90 Finally, the fair-market-value determination is
made before the condemnation. That is, "a condemnee is entitled to the fair
market value of his property in its highest and best use other than the use
proposed by the condemnor." 9' As a result, the condemnee does not share in
any increased value that the condemnation adds to the property,92 despite the
fact that an exercise of eminent domain almost always raises the value of the
property.93
The very fact that the Constitution allocates one hundred percent of this
condemnation surplus to the condemnor, or the private beneficiary of the
condemnation as the case may be, may itself be demoralizing for a property
owner. As Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky recently observed,
"While people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity, when
the windfall arrives as a result of a strategic and deliberate decision of the
government, the reaction may turn to resentment and frustration. '94 This is
especially true if the windfall is enjoyed by the politically powerful at the
expense of vulnerable outsiders to the political process. Consider, for exam-
ple, a recent dispute over the construction of a major Nissan assembly facility
in rural Mississippi. 95 The state "outbid" several other states competing for
the facility with a package of tax-financed incentives totaling more than $400
million and an offer to use the power of eminent domain to condemn more
than two and one-half square miles, if necessary. 96 Two black families
90 See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 83 (noting that lost goodwill,
relocation expenses, consequential damages to other property, and attorney fees are not com-
pensable); see also Schill, Intergovernmental Takings, supra note 71, at 890-92 (noting that own-
ers are not indemnified for economic losses attributed to business disruption, lost goodwill,
relocation costs, or litigation expenses). These problems have been addressed legislatively in
some contexts. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000). The urban renewal experience again illustrates
these problems: at least one-third of businesses displaced during the era failed, leaving owners
devastated. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 35.
91 Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 83.
92 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943) ("The owners ought not to gain by
speculating on probable increase in value due to the Government's activities."); Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) ("[V]alue to be ascertained does not include, and the owner is
not entitled to compensation for any element resulting subsequently to or because of the
taking.").
93 Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 85 (noting that "[elminent domain
almost always generates a surplus" which is awarded solely to the condemnor); EPsTrEIN, TAK-
INGS, supra note 29, at 163-64 (questioning division on fairness grounds).
94 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 579 (2001).
Michelman uses similar logic to argue that the risks of a taking are different in kind than other
risks of loss. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 21, at 1217 (arguing that
takings permit majority government to impose cost that is "self-determining and purposive, as
compared to other loss-determining forces which seem to be randomly generated").
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spurned the state's offers to purchase their farms, accusing the state of treat-
ing white and black land owners differently. One of the landowners
explained,
My grandfather bought this land in 1941. There's 15 of our families
right around here, and none of them want to live anywhere else.
But then the state comes in and pushes us around and tells us
they're going to turn our land over to a private company. It's not
right.9
7
Owners forced to relinquish their rights under such circumstances under-
standably may feel that they are just as much the victim of "capricious redis-
tribution" 98 as the "uncompensated losers" that concerned Michelman. 99
B. "Singling Out"
Furthermore, in the regulatory takings context, a number of scholars
have argued that the justification for compensation is greatest when, using
Saul Levmore's words, "the government singles out a private party, in the
sense that the government's aims could have been achieved in many ways but
the means chosen placed losses on an individual .... -100 Levmore suggests
that the "singling out" rationale for compensation rests in part on the need to
deter government from exploiting politically unorganized and vulnerable
persons, an argument which is echoed throughout the takings literature. 10 '
97 Id.
98 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 21, at 1215.
99 Id. at 1214. Michelman himself complained during the urban renewal period about the
"violent unfairness" of forced relocations: "There is no palpable reciprocity; the sufferers rarely
double as special gainers, and they must submit to the spectacle of private land developers (or
new residents) moving in for what looks like a publicly subsidized benefit." Id. at 1255. See also
Durham, supra note 61, at 1307 (noting that "[t]he specific demoralization costs caused by the
taking will be amplified when the taking's outcome is not to the owner's liking"). Michelman
and others have argued that additional demoralization costs are incurred by similarly situated
individuals who observe this scenario, sympathize with the victims, and worry about incurring
similar losses in the future. See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 154 (noting
that Michelman attributes demoralization costs to those that look to future and fear similar
losses); Durham, supra note 61, at 1310 (discussing demoralization costs suffered by similarly
situated owners). The literature on the "insurance model" of takings explores and questions this
assumption. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 67, at 283-87 (reviewing literature); see also, e.g., Law-
rence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Empirical Analysis, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 569, 590-94 (1984); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of 'Just Compensation' Law, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 269 (1988); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509 (1986).
100 Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-45 (1991)
[hereinafter Levmore, Takings, Torts and Special Interests]; see also, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A
Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992) [hereinafter
Lunney, Critical Reexamination] (greater scrutiny needed when concentrated groups impose
costs on individuals); Merrill, Rights as Public Goods, supra note 54, at 880 ("fair share" justifi-
cation for regulatory takings reflecting principle that the Takings Clause prohibits "spot"
redistribution).
10 See Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, supra note 100, at 1345; see also Hel-
ler & Krier, supra note 20, at 99 (Takings Clause can "constrain governmental inclinations to
exploit politically vulnerable groups and individuals"); Levmore, Just Compensation, supra note
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And, as the Mississippi case illustrates, one reason to distrust-and discour-
age-government actions that "single out" individuals, especially those who
are politically vulnerable, is that the act of being singled out is itself demoral-
izing. Some commentators have used the "singling out" logic to explain Nol-
Ian and Dolan, arguing that the heightened scrutiny resulted from the Court's
suspicion of regulators' exercise of discretion vis-a-vis individual landown-
ers.'0 2 But, if this fact justifies heightened scrutiny of land acquisition, it is
hardly limited to exactions. On the contrary, every exercise of eminent do-
main, by definition, "singles out" individual property owners.'0 3
In fact, some individuals forced to involuntarily part with their property
in an eminent-domain proceeding may be worse off than those who face an
aggressive regulatory authority that has "singled them out" for a develop-
ment exaction. The very fact that a regulatory authority is empowered to
demand an exaction reflects two facts: first, bargaining is a part of the Ameri-
can land use planning process, 104 and second, the landowner is not entitled to
the permit that she seeks from the regulator. 105 During negotiations with
landowners, the regulatory authorities exercise their discretion to offer the
landowner a valuable benefit (the green light to develop land) in exchange
for the relinquishment of some property rights. By injecting the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine into this area of law, the Court has weighed in on
25, at 306-07 (predicting that targets of takings, compensated and uncompensated, are likely to
be underrepresented in political process).
102 See Dana, supra note 18, at 1261 (discussing-and rejecting-argument that Nollan and
Dolan stem from suspicion of regulators' exercise of discretion). A number of courts have ruled
that Nollan/Dolan apply only when an exaction is demanded by a regulator exercising discretion,
not when one is imposed pursuant to generally applicable legislative standards. See, e.g., Rogers
Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 983 (Or. 2002) (holding rough proportionality
analysis inapplicable to monetary impact fees that are legislatively determined and generally
applied); San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002) (refus-
ing to apply Dolan standard because exaction did not result from exercise of discretion); Santa
Monica Beach v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 968 P.2d 993, 1002 (Cal. 1999) (holding that
essential nexus test does not apply to rent control ordinance); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that Dolan does not extend to monetary impact
fees imposed as part of uniform regulatory scheme); Erlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444
(Cal. 1996) (applying Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions imposed by exercise of
discretion).
103 See, e.g., Durham, supra note 61, at 1307-08 (arguing that eminent domain results in
high demoralization costs because it pits one person or a small group of persons against the
state). The same cannot be said of exactions, which frequently are imposed as part of a general
regulatory scheme. As David Dana points out, the exactions at issue in both Nollan and Dolan
did not in fact result from a "singling out" of a property owner. On the contrary, "both Nollan
and Dolan involved the straightforward application of general policies or statutes to specific
parcels rather than individual regulators' exercise of case-specific discretion." See Dana, supra
note 18, at 1261.
104 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem
of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 841 (1983) (noting presence of dealmaking between
landowners and developers as subject of criticism in scholarly literature).
105 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 51, at 5 (describing the "paradox" of uncon-
stitutional conditions).
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the property owner's side to minimize opportunities for governmental abuse
of power.
10 6
Still, even a target of governmental extortion has a choice. Indeed, if a
property owner did not value the permit sought more than the exaction de-
manded, the government would stand to gain nothing by seeking to impose
the condition. 10 7 The targets of eminent-domain proceedings have no such
choice, but rather are forced to relinquish their rights to advance what they
are told is the common good. Given the inadequacies of monetary compen-
sation discussed above, owners who exchange property rights for a develop-
ment permit may gain more than those compensated for property taken by
eminent domain: not only is the permission to develop a valuable benefit, it
may in fact be more valuable than the exaction demanded for it. Douglas
Kendall and James Ryan have argued that, to avoid complying with Nollan
and Dolan, municipalities should use their power of eminent domain to con-
demn the land demanded for an exaction and offer the property owner the
choice of monetary compensation or compensation in the form of the desired
discretionary land use approval. Kendall and Ryan suggest that most prop-
erty owners will prefer the development permit because its value exceeds the
fair market value of the land demanded as an exaction. 10 8
C. The Limits of Compensation and the Politics of Economic
Development
Additionally, the compensation requirement (and presumably the scru-
tiny used to trigger it) is said to deter the government from overconsuming
private property. 0 9 Other scholars have argued that the compensation re-
106 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (discussing worries about "ex-
tortion" in regulatory process).
107 See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 51, at 182 (probable that the loss that regulator
can inflict by denying development approval exceeds value of exaction). Epstein notes that this
prediction is more than "idle speculation": forty-three out of forty-four landowners accepted the
conditions at issue in Nollan. Only the Nollans challenged them. Id.; see also Michelman, Tak-
ings, supra note 40, at 1611 (observing that the Nollans were made better off by the offer of the
conditional grant of the permit because the California Coastal Commission could have simply
denied their application outright); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 856 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (making
similar point).
108 See Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent
Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV. 1801, 1803 (1995).
Evidence supporting this hypothesis can be found in the annals of American constitutional his-
tory. In 1982, the Supreme Court held that a New York law requiring a landlord to permit the
installation of cable facilities on his property constituted a per se compensable taking. Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). On remand, the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the state's finding that only $1.00 in compensation was due to the landlord.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983); see also EP-
STEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 51, at 183 (noting that the Nollan rule "is not without its dan-
gers," including the possibility that the government will purchase the easement for less than its
value to the property owners, and/or will deny the permit, leaving the property owners worse off
than if they simply accepted the demand).
109 See EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 51, at 84-85 (discussing the deterrent function of
compensation); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992) ("The
simplest economic explanation for the requirement of just compensation is that it prevents the
government from "verusing the taking power."); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings,
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quirement serves the function that Heller and Krier label "specific deter-
rence," whereby "the obligation to pay compensation can constrain
governmental inclinations to exploit politically vulnerable groups and indi-
viduals." 110 The Court's expression of concern in Dolan that the government
might use exactions as a "short cut" to acquire land suggests that a desire to
deter government overreach may have influenced the decision to subject ex-
actions to heightened scrutiny.''
Yet the historical record suggests that the compensation required when
the government acquires land by eminent domain does not always serve ei-
ther of the deterrent functions mentioned above.' 12 That is, the government
sometimes exercises its power of eminent domain in a way that is both ineffi-
cient and detrimental to the interests of politically unconnected, vulnerable
individuals and groups. The most vivid (but by no means the only) evidence
comes, again, from the condemnations enabling urban renewal and the con-
struction of the interstate highway system, both of which were characterized
by a massive exercise of the power of eminent domain that resulted in both
overconsumption of private land and exploitation of vulnerable popula-
tions." 13 For example, the highway and urban renewal programs were known
to detractors as "Negro Removal"' 14-an appellation that apparently was de-
Insurance and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law,
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 269-70 (1988) (arguing that compensation serves function of "disciplin-
ing the power of the state, which would otherwise overexpand unless made to pay for the re-
sources that it consumes"); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 349 (2000) ("This 'efficiency'
rational for compensating takings . . . remains widely accepted by economically minded com-
mentators as the most important justification for just compensation.").
110 Heller & Krier, supra note 20, at 999; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 96-97 (1980) (compensation principle provides illustration of legal protection of mi-
norities); Levmore, Just Compensation, supra note 25, at 309 ("A central theme of takings law is
that protection is offered against the possibility that majorities may mistreat minorities.").
11 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (t994) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)).
112 Some commentators have attributed this fact to the fair-market-value measure of com-
pensation, and have therefore suggested that full indemnification award would serve an addi-
tional deterrent function. See Durham, supra note 61, at 1300-01. Richard Epstein has
proposed that the condemnation award should total 150% of the property's fair market value, in
part to deter government overreach due to secondary rent seeking. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra
note 29. Some empirical evidence suggests that increasing the level of compensation will deter
overuse of the eminent-domain power. See Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Govern-
ment Behavior in Response to Compensation Requirements, 11 J. PUB. ECON. 47-58 (1979) (find-
ing that additional compensation required by Uniform Relocation Assistance Act reduced
highway construction outlays); see also FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 96-97
(discussing studies supporting compensation/condemnation connection).
113 FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 29 ("Whatever the motivation, the poor and the
minorities were the leading victims of the highway and urban renewal programs."). A classic
example (from the same era) of inefficient exercise of eminent-domain powers-resulting in
massive and unnecessary forced displacements-is the construction of New York's Cross Bronx
Expressway. "Uber-planner" Robert Moses insisted on a route that destroyed the tight-knit
East Tremont community, even though a shorter route was available. As a result, the project
cost $10 million more and displaced over 1500 more families than necessary. See, e.g., Durham,
supra note 61, at 1298-99 (recounting story).
114 During the same period, Frieden and Sagalyn recount that "officials from several cities
told highway lobbyist Alf Johnson that the urban interstates would give them a good opportunity
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served in some cases. Miles Lord, who oversaw interstate highway takings
while serving as the Minnesota Attorney General, later recalled:
We went through the black section between Minneapolis and St.
Paul ... about four blocks wide and we took out the home of every
black man in that city. And woman and child .... Nice little neat
black neighborhood, you know, with their churches and all and we
gave them about $6,000 a house and turned them loose onto
society.' 15
And, as for the efficiency of these takings, the wisdom of the massive land
grab that enabled the construction of our interstate highway system remains
the subject of substantial debate. 16 The same cannot be said, however, of
urban renewal. Despite the enthusiasm of "slum clearance" proponents,
whose viewpoint the Supreme Court accepted with vigor in Berman v.
Parker,117 urban renewal generally is considered an abysmal failure. As
Michael Schill has observed, "[t]he numbers of jobs created and the amount
of private sector investment generated by the program were below hopes and
expectations of its proponents [and] the human toll caused by displacement
and the destabilization of nearby residential communities casts doubt upon
the efficacy of subsidized site assembly."'"18
Sadly, in many places, urban renewal likely made things worse." 9 After
bulldozers destroyed intact communities and scattered residents to the winds,
many residents found themselves worse off than they were while living in a
to get rid of the local '[n-town].' ... Whatever the motivation, the poor and minorities were the
leading victims of the highway and renewal programs." FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at
28-29.
115 Id. at 29.
116 See, e.g., William Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 58, 64-74 (1999) (noting that highway system contributes to
suburban sprawl and discussing the benefits and costs of that phenomenon); Robert H. Freilich
& Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs and Benefits of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183, 184 (1997)
(connecting highway construction and sprawl and claiming sprawl has "engendered ... major
crises for America's major metropolitan regions"). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: EXTENT OF FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON "URBAN SPRAWL" IS
UNCLEAR (1999) (discussing various factors contributing to the suburban sprawl phenomenon).
117 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
118 Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795,
808-09 (1991) [hereinafter Schill, Deconcentrating]; see also FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note
74, at 34 (discussing psychological studies finding that forty percent of residents displaced by
urban renewal had "severe, long-term grief reactions").
119 Critiques of the largely discredited urban renewal experiment abound. Jane Jacobs's
classic, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961), is an early example of this
genre which has inspired subsequent generations of planners, including early proponents of "en-
terprise zones," see STUART M. BUTLER, ENTERPRISE ZONES: GREENLINING THE INNER CITIES
(1981), and, more recently, the self-styled "new urbanists." On new urbanism, see generally
ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE
AMERICAN DREAM (2000); JERRY FRUG, BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
149-54 (1999); VINCENT KATZ & PETER SCULLY, THE NEW URBANISM: TOWARDS AN ARCHI-
TECTURE OF COMMUNITY (1994); see also http://www.cnu.org (website of Congress for the New
Urbanism). Another early critique of urban renewal is MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL
BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962 (1964). For a more recent
critique, see, for example, FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 15-60.
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"blighted" neighborhood. Not only did they lose intact, and fairly stable,
communities, 20 but many had difficulty even locating a new place to live.
This was especially true of black families, for whom the postdisplacement
situation was "close to desperate."' 21 Continued migration from the rural
South led to overcrowding in the remaining black neighborhoods, and sys-
tematic housing discrimination made white areas off-limits even for those
who could afford them. 12 2 Most of those displaced during the period eventu-
ally found replacement housing, but many ended up paying more for living
arrangements that were not appreciably better than those they left behind. 123
Adding insult to injury, redevelopment efforts tended to proceed at an
excruciatingly slow pace. On average, it took three years for the local gov-
ernment even to sell the condemned land to a private developer. 124 In its
report to Congress and President Johnson, the United States National Com-
mission on Urban Problems deplored the "unconscionable amount of time
consumed" by the urban renewal process. 125 Writing in 1959, Lyman Brown-
field, general counsel for the United States Housing and Home Finance
Agency, complained that cities had disposed of only thirty percent of the land
acquired through urban renewal programs. 26 Local officials only made mat-
ters worse by creating "land banks," i.e., by condemning and stockpiling land
until needed. 127 Even more depressingly, "many cities saw nothing at all rise
from the ground."'128 As of 1965, the Kosciusko Project in St. Louis, South-
west Temple Project in Philadelphia, and Camden Industrial Park in Balti-
more had been vacant since 1956, and the Ellicott District Project in Buffalo
and Lake Meadows Project in Chicago had been vacant since 1952.129 Rub-
ble-strewn wastelands in St. Louis and Detroit earned such less-than-affec-
tionate nicknames as "Hiroshima flats" and "ragweed acres.' 130 Although
much of the land condemned for urban renewal purposes was eventually de-
120 Frieden and Sagalyn note that "renewal planners had a knack for picking low-income
neighborhoods where residents had deep attachments to friends, neighbors, churches, schools,
and local businesses. For immigrants and other city dwellers who needed the security of a sup-
portive neighborhood . . . eviction on short notice created nothing less than a life crisis."
FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 33-34.
121 Id. at 29.
122 Id. at 30.
123 The typical residents displaced by urban renewal paid twenty percent more rent after
being relocated; subsequent studies found from one-fourth to one-half of displaced families liv-
ing in substandard housing despite a substantial rent increase. Id. at 33. Studies of the problems
faced by displaced households are summarized in Chester W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory
Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 745 (1971).
124 David B. Carlson, The Unrealized Profits in Urban Renewal, ARCHITEcrURAL FORUM,
July 1962, at 101.
125 NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No.
91-34 (1969).
126 Lyman Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 732, 740 (1960).
127 Id.
128 FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 43.
129 Urban Renewal Wastelands: Cities' Development Is Suffering as Bulldozed Acres Lie Idle
and Untaxed, NATION'S BUS., Apr. 1965, at 86-87.
130 Roger Montgomery, Improving the Design Process in Urban Renewal, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 454, 459-66 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966).
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veloped, the problems that continue to stem from vacant, never-renewed
land are myriad: not only does a city lose tax revenue from the land lying
vacant (which depresses the value of the adjacent property), but neighboring
residents must cope with concomitant ills such as crime, vandalism, fire
hazards, and worry about unsafe and unsanitary conditions. 31
Modern-day economic development efforts enabled through the 'use of
eminent domain pale in comparison to the grand ambitions of the urban re-
newal enthusiasts.1 32 In addition, conventional wisdom is that local govern-
ments have gotten "better" at redevelopment. The jury is still out, however,
on whether redevelopment actually benefits the public.133 Those touting ur-
ban "success stories" must contend with dismal failures like New Haven,
Connecticut's Ninth Square Project. 34 Even floating a redevelopment pro-
posal may cause blight as existing residents and businesses rationally antici-
pate future displacement by deferring maintenance and/or relocating before
a mass exodus depresses property values.135 (This problem is pervasive
enough that courts have developed the doctrine of "condemnation blight" to
deal with it.' 36) Ultimately, the government may end up holding a large
amount of land that has been rendered uninhabitable, and therefore "un-
renewable," precisely because the government threatened to take the land to
renew it. 137 And, because many relocated businesses fail, renewal efforts can
have the perverse effect of permanently removing businesses from down-
town.138 This prospect is particularly troubling as a matter of "fairness" and
"justice": after all, the businesses "renewed" out of business may be long-
term stakeholders that stuck it out through economically difficult times.' 39
131 See John Accordino & Gary T. Johnson, Addressing the Vacant and Abandoned Prop-
erty Problem, 22 J. URn. AFF. 301, 303 (2000).
132 See FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 133 (noting that later renewal projects were
smaller in scale).
133 Cf Kirk Johnson, A Plan Without a Master; Rebuilding by Committee? Robert Moses
Would Cringe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at 35 (discussing negatives of the "democratization" of
urban planning in context of "Ground Zero" redevelopment). See generally FRIEDEN &
SAGALYN, supra note 74, 171-239 (extensive discussion of the debate over the "downtown mall"
phenomenon).
134 See generally John P. Elwood, Rethinking Government Participation in Urban Renewal:
Neighborhood Revitalization in New Haven, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 138, 150-53 (1994)
(describing the history of failed redevelopment efforts).
135 Id. at 177-78; see also, e.g., City of Buffalo v. George Irish Paper Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14
(App. Div. 1969) (holding that "cloud of condemnation" resulting from a redevelopment propo-
sal effected a de facto taking of property; plaintiff's tenants refused to renew leases after learning
of the plans).
136 See 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12B.17[6] (revised 3d. ed.
2002) (defining condemnation blight as the "debilitating effect upon value of a threatened, immi-
nent or potential condemnation"). Condemnation blight is sometimes found to be a compensa-
ble de facto taking, in which case the court will move the date of the acquisition forward to
reflect the loss in value caused by the threat of eminent domain. See id.; S. William Moore &
Lorena Hart Ludovici, Making a Case for Pre-Condemnation Blight, SD40 ALI-ABA 93, 99
(1999). But cf., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) (rejecting claim that
property-value losses attributable to abandoned condemnation effort constituted "taking" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment).
137 Elwood, supra note 134, at 178.
138 See, e.g., id. at 180.
139 See, e.g., Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel
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Public-choice theory offers one explanation why compensation will not
necessarily deter inefficient (and unjust) government land grabs. As Daryl
Levinson recently observed, "[b]ecause government actors respond to politi-
cal, not market, incentives, we should not assume that government will inter-
nalize social costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay. ' ' 140 As
a result, the very fact that the government can spread the burden of compen-
sation among large numbers of taxpayers, and thus expend little political cap-
ital, suggests that compensation alone may underdeter the government from
exercising the power of eminent domain. 14 1
This is especially true if a government with its "economic back to the
wall"' 42 turns to eminent domain to attract economic development. It is no
secret that many major cities did not fare well economically in the late twen-
tieth century. Urban cores emptied as first residents and then businesses fled
to greener suburban pastures, 143 leaving local governments determined to do
something, anything, to stop the downward spiral. 44 Many cities in this situa-
tion-and, more curiously, many which are faring much better,'4 5-have
Perspective, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 333, 371 (1984) ("Perhaps the major moral issue is the basic
question whether it is morally acceptable for society to allow a poor person to be forced from his
home in order to bring new investment and new people into a particular neighborhood. We
have been doing that for at least forty years, but the question will not go away."); see also, e.g.,
Steigerwald, supra note 7, at 32 (noting that some of the businesses slated for displacement in
Pittsburgh had remained in same location "since Grover Cleveland was president"). The busi-
nesses displaced by eminent domain are not the only historical losses-the buildings housing
them are lost as well. For this reason, the National Trust for Historic Preservation placed both
Pittsburgh's Fifth and Forbes area and a west Baltimore neighborhood slated for redevelopment
on its "11 Most Endangered Historic Places List." Susan French, There Goes the Neighborhood:
To Spark Urban Renewal, Some Towns Dynamite History, PRESERVATION MAGAZINE, Jan. 4,
2002, http://www.nationaltrust.org/magazine/archives/ach-story/010402.htm. In Baltimore alone,
as many as 150 historic buildings were slated for demolition. Id. Urban Renewal destroyed
countless irreplaceable, historic buildings. Ironically, decades later, "new urbanism" has become
the hottest planning trend, with developers building new neighborhoods designed to look like
the ones lost forever to progress. See generally, KATZ & SCULLY, supra note 119.
140 Levinson, supra note 109, at 347.
141 See id. at 377 (discussing the relative disinterest that dispersed voters will likely take to
tax burden imposed by compensation); Farber, supra note 67, at 290-94 (same).
142 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 467 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
143 See, e.g., John D. Kasarda, Industrial Restructuring and the Changing Location of Jobs,
in 1 STATE OF THE UNION: AMERICA IN THE 1990's 215, 216, 239-52 (Reynolds Farley ed., 1995)
(discussing post-War War II economic trends); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Local-
ism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 356-57 (1990) (noting that "[s]uburban growth-
the emigration of people and businesses from city centers to outlying areas-has been a constant
feature of... American urban history.... For more than a century, people have moved away
from the older sections of cities"); Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 118, at 799-800 (discussing
suburbanization and "spacial mismatch" hypothesis).
144 Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 118, at 799. For an exploration of whether local
governments' desire to attract development will lead to a "race to the bottom" with respect to
environmental policy, see generally Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996).
145 For example, a few years ago my hometown of Overland Park, Kansas (a middle class
Kansas City suburb) engaged in a bidding war with ten cities to retain the NCAA corporate
headquarters. After soliciting the bids, Indianapolis lured the nonprofit away with a larger sub-
sidy, offering $50 million compared to Overland Park's $35 million. See Vic Feuerherd, NCAA
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demonstrated a seemingly limitless willingness to promote development
through what might be called "reverse exactions." The current economic de-
velopment landscape is characterized by a dizzying array of subsidized fi-
nancing, tax abatements, infrastructure improvements and other "goodies"-
including the sale (or sometimes the gift) of property seized by eminent do-
main. 146 All of these incentives aim to induce local businesses to remain at
home or to lure businesses away from other locations. 147 At times these in-
ducements are offered to investors "shopping" for a location-as was the
case with a recent bidding war between Dallas, Denver and Chicago for the
Boeing headquarters. 148 At other times, as in the famed Poletown situation,
officials face a "put up or shut up" threat from a business demanding millions
of dollars in tax subsidies and the government's services as a highly effective
real estate broker.149
Sets Bad Example with Move, Wis. STATE J., June 10, 1997, at 1C. Well-to-do suburbs' participa-
tion in the development-attraction game is curious because localities with high levels of home
ownership have traditionally tended toward exclusion rather than invitation. See, e.g., WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 162-64 (2001); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 405-09 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls] (describing homeowner preference for growth con-
trols); Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 161-65
(2001) (characterizing municipal land use politics as a "pattern of exclusion and invitation").
146 In the recent 99 Cents Only case, for example, a redevelopment authority paid the
owner of valuable commercial real estate a $38-million condemnation award and then sold the
property to Costco, Inc. for $1.00. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th
Cir. 2003).
147 See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Con-
straints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382-89 (describing increas-
ing use of public assets to keep local businesses from relocating or to lure businesses away from
other states); Clayton P. Gillette, The Law and Economics of Federalism: Business Incentives,
Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 479 (1998) (discussing
incentive competition between states); Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 118, at 809-10 & n.73
(discussing enterprise zones, tax abatements and exemptions, subsidized loans and industrial
revenue bonds). Government incentives for development are hardly a new phenomenon. Oscar
and Mary Handlin's classic study teaches that they were common at birth of our nation, see
OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH (rev. ed. 1969) (describing early
state development policies), and the massive public investment in railroads during the nine-
teenth century provides yet another example of using incentives to spur development, see, e.g.,
WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS 63-74 (1991) (discussing role of railroads in Chi-
cago's development). The diversity of the subsidy methods and the amount of money offered,
however, appears to have crested during the past two decades. See KENNETH P. THOMAS. COM-
PETING FOR CAPITAL: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA IN A GLOBAL ERA 159 (2000) (estimating
that total subsidies from state and local governments now totals $48.8 billion annually); Enrich,
supra, at 386-87. Thus far, Congress has declined to intervene to halt or limit the use of incen-
tives. See Gillette, supra, at 478 (noting and disputing argument in favor of federal intervention).
For discussion of whether the "dormant" Commerce Clause may restrain the use of incentives,
see, for example, Enrich, supra; Walter Hellerstein & Dan Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints
on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996).
148 See Mark Brown, Boeing Swoops in for a Closer Look, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001,
at 2. Chicago won the competition, with a $61-million incentive package. See Mike Comerford,
No Soft Landing, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Dec. 23, 2001, at 2.
149 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460 (Mich.
1981) (describing the details of GM's proposal for the condemnation of Poletown to make way
2003]
The George Washington Law Review
Consider the extremes to which state and local governments have
proven willing to go in the past decade: as a condition of building a new
racetrack, Kansas International Speedway Corporation ("KISC") insisted
that Kansas amend its urban redevelopment law to allow KISC to qualify for
tax increment financing; declare part of economically depressed Wyandotte
County a "major tourism area"; condemn a large portion of a blue-collar
neighborhood to make way for a new auto racetrack; and exempt the race-
track from all property taxes for thirty years.15 0 Alabama sought to attract a
Mercedes-Benz plant by offering to acquire and improve the factory site, buy
twenty-five hundred of the vehicles produced, and train and pay the salary of
workers for one year.'51 A Michigan incentives package offered to a paper
recycling mill cost the state $2.4 million per job. 152 And, Amarillo, Texas
mailed a check for eight million dollars to thirteen hundred companies
around the country; each company was invited to cash the check in exchange
for a commitment to create seven hundred new jobs in the city. 53 State and
local governments remain locked in this seemingly ever-escalating "economic
war between the states" despite the fact that available empirical evidence
suggests that fierce intergovernmental competition renders development in-
centives ineffective. 54
Both practical experience and economic theory demonstrate why the
government's ability to bypass the market, and therefore avoid holdouts and
other land assembly problems, makes eminent domain an attractive "incen-
tive" to offer to private companies. The potential beneficiaries have a sub-
stantial incentive to engage in rent seeking to secure the benefit of this
bypass 155 (not to mention to capture all or part of the "condemnation bonus"
for new plant); FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 105 (describing demands made by
"anchor" stores in Pasadena, California downtown mall as "unconscionable").
15o See Kansas ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't, 962 P.2d 543, 549-50 (Kan. 1998).
15, Ivan C. Dale, Comment, Economic Development Incentives, Accountability Legislation
and a Double Negative Commerce Clause, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 247, 253 (2002).
152 Id. (describing several incentive packages).
153 See Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War
Among the States, THE REGION, March 1995, available at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar
1994.html (noting that "[w]hat is so remarkable about these two initiatives is that they are not
remarkable").
154 See, e.g., INST. ON TAXATION AND ECON. POLICY, MINDING THE CANDY STORE: STATE
AUDITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 35-41 (2000) (summarizing fifteen state audits that show
development incentives are generally ineffective); Franklin J. James, Economic Development: A
Zero-Sum Game?, in URBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 157, 161 (Richard D. Bingham & John
P. Blair eds., 1984) ("There is no convincing empirical evidence that urban economic develop-
ment as currently practiced is more than a zero sum game."); Enrich, supra note 147, at 390-405
(summarizing economic evidence and concluding that "[f]rom the states's collective vantage
point, the net effect of the incentive competition is, in fact, far worse than zero-sum. For, al-
though the states can expect to achieve no overall gain in business activity or jobs, they do incur
a very substantial loss of tax revenues."); Schill, Deconcentrating, supra note 118, at 810 ("An-
other reason for the limited usefulness of economic development incentives is their ubiquity.
Since many jurisdictions offer these benefits they cease to generate an advantage for any particu-
lar locale."). But cf. Gillette, supra note 147, at 452 (characterizing empirical studies evaluating
subsidies as "inconclusive"); id. at 453-78 (reviewing and questioning argument that incentives
are usually a net loss for the offering jurisdiction).
155 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 29, at 161-81; Merrill, Economics of Public Use,
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discussed above).15 6 This incentive only increases if the government is willing
to transfer title to a private beneficiary at below-market prices' 57-or along
with an attractive package of tax incentives. A basic lesson of public-choice
theory is that governments respond to connected insiders' demands and dis-
count the needs of unorganized individuals. This reality undercuts Fischel's
prediction that public outcry resulting from forced displacements will limit
the instances of "cases that flirt with the borderlines of public use," by forc-
ing reputation-minded public officials to "respond[ ] to the potential for inef-
ficiency and unfairness in using eminent domain. ' 158 Even if the targets of
the government wrecking ball have the high stakes that give them an organi-
zational advantage over disconnected taxpayers, they will not necessarily be
able to turn elected officials' eyes away from the prize offered by a well-
heeled developer promising economic salvation.159 This is especially true if
elected officials believe that they are locked in a prisoners' dilemma with
other locations, making it practically impossible to be the first to cry
"chicken" in the incentive game. 160
For these reasons, the democratic process may be better able to limit the
use of development exactions than the exercise of eminent domain. For ex-
ample, Vicki Been has drawn upon the work of Albert Hircshmann 161 and
Charles Tiebout 162 to argue that local governments' ability to impose land use
supra note 17, at 85-87. Some commentators have suggested that an anticompensation require-
ment might more effectively contain the rent-seeking problem by creating in the uncompensated
losers a powerful lobby against government projects. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 67, at 291-92;
Levinson, supra note 109, at 377 (suggesting that regulatory takings may in fact generate more
political opposition than compensated ones).
156 See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
157 See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1126 (C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating
government plan to purchase property for $3.8 million and transfer it to Costco Corporation for
$1.00).
158 FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 74-77.
159 See Farber, supra note 67, at 289-90 (questioning whether targets of takings are as dis-
advantaged as the literature predicts but admitting that "[aIll things being equal, it probably is
still true that the dispossessed are disadvantaged by the one-shot nature of their involvement.
Thus, relative to other concentrated groups (such as the construction firms that may support
government construction), they may have less clout .... ).
160 See Enrich, supra note 147, at 396 ("[T]he political costs of adopting tax breaks for
businesses are lower than the costs of failing to participate aggressively in the incentive bidding
competition. Consequently, the states find themselves caught in a classic prisoners' dilemma....
[I]f the other states are going to offer a widening array of tax breaks, then none can afford the
costs-more political than economic-of abstaining."); Matthew Schaefer, State Investment At-
traction Subsidy Wars Resulting from a Prisoner's Dilemma, 28 N.M. L. REV. 303, 311-12 (1998).
Former Illinois Governor Jim Edgar has claimed that a unilateral cutback in business incentives
would be "just as unrealistic as it would be for the United States to have withdrawn unilaterally
from the nuclear arms race." Jim Edgar, Are Economic Development Incentives Smart?, STATE
Gov'T NEWS, Mar. 1993, at 12. But cf. Gillette, supra note 147, at 471-72 (asserting that while
public choice arguments about inevitability of subsidies "have a ring of truth" they discount the
ability of opponents to organize and limit them).
161 See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970).
162 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
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exactions is limited by private developers' ability to reject their demands and
take their development business elsewhere. 63 Been observes that a "com-
munity must compete with other jurisdictions if it wants to encourage devel-
opment because a developer dissatisfied with a community's exactions policy
can take the project to another jurisdiction that offers better terms. '1 64
Therefore, posits Been, market forces-rather than judicial scrutiny-will
adequately prevent overregulation in most cases. 165 The public-choice model
reinforces this assumption; if developers are politically organized and influ-
ential (as much of the land use literature assumes that they are), their argu-
ments against exactions may carry significant weight.166
Leaving aside the question of whether Professor Been's conclusions
about exactions are correct as an empirical matter, 67 the political "market"
for development would appear to be better able to check exactions than the
exercise of the eminent-domain power. Professor Been's analysis is based
upon the assumption that developers choosing where to locate can influence
land use regulators.168 The "victims" of eminent domain, however, are not
outsiders making a locational decision, and therefore lack the developers'
power of "exit" (which is actually the refusal to enter). A property owner
displaced by eminent domain is situated where Professor Been admits that
market forces will not adequately police government overreach: she has al-
ready made the decision to situate within a community, 169 perhaps-as Tie-
163 Been, supra note 50, at 509-28.
164 Id. at 509; see also id. at 511-28 (discussing empirical evidence supporting Tiebout's
hypothesis that "jurisdictions compete for residents by attempting to offer desirable public ser-
vice tax packages").
165 Id. at 545.
166 See, e.g., Dana, supra note 18, at 1272 (describing "under regulation account," which
attributes lax land use regulation to developers' political influence); Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls, supra note 145, at 407-09 (describing "developer influence" model of land use law);
Gillette, supra note 147, at 470 (discussing argument that "[plolitical officials ... have a bias in
favor of unchecked business development, regardless of its effects"). For a recent example of
developers' political clout, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 158, 171-73 (2001) (attributing failure of state-wide growth control initiatives to devel-
opers political clout).
167 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land
Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1992) (questioning Professor Been's conclusions). One
possible counter to Been's conclusion is that, in many localities, the dominant political force may
be homeowners who stand to benefit from overregulation, rather than developers who would
prefer a more relaxed regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 18, at 1269-71 (if dominant
political forces benefit from overregulation, local politicians might respond to their demands,
even at the detriment of the overall welfare of the community); Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls, supra note 145, at 510 (arguing that majoritarian preferences of homeowners might
lead to exclusion of development justifying judicial review). For a comprehensive discussion of
the effect of homeowner political clout on local government policies, see generally FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 145.
168 Been, supra note 50, at 509.
169 Id. at 539-40 (discussing situations when market forces will not adequately constrain
government action); Farber, supra note 67, at 290 (observing that the "one-shot nature" of prop-
erty-owners' involvement in a taking disadvantages them in political process); Levmore, Just
Compensation, supra note 25, at 305-19 (arguing that the compensation requirement is needed
to protect "occasional individuals" singled out for a taking because they are politically
powerless).
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bout would predict-because of the package of goods and services offered by
the local government, but, more likely, as the result of a complicated array of
social and economic factors. As Professor Been observes, "even a family that
has few emotional ties to a community will have to incur moving costs in
order to exit the community .... Many families also would suffer psychologi-
cal costs if they moved, and thus could be made to pay a substantial exaction
before they would leave the community.' 170 Property owners in such a situa-
tion must resort to what Hirschman calls "voice," that is, rallying public op-
position to a taking.171 While such efforts have succeeded in some cases, 172 as
Fischel predicts, the threat of public opposition to an exercise of eminent
domain does not promise the systematic deterrent provided by the develop-
ers' power of exit.
D. The Ends Question (Again)
Finally, the means scrutiny demanded by Nollan and Dolan inevitably
provides courts with insight about the ends of government action. In other
words, means-ends analysis permits the courts to scrutinize beyond simply
whether the government is securing property by constitutionally valid means.
It also gives the courts a "back door" way to determine whether the property
is being taken for a constitutionally appropriate purpose (or, at least, will be
used for the purpose asserted by the government ex ante) or whether it will
be put to another, perhaps illegitimate, use. As Professor Sunstein has ob-
served in another context, "[t]he careful scrutiny of means-ends connections
operates to 'flush out' impermissible ends."'1 73 This use of the means-ends
analysis is readily demonstrated in Nollan, when the Court expresses concern
that "the lack of a nexus between the condition and the original purpose of
the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it
was."1
74
170 Been, supra note 50, at 540; see also EPSTEIN, BARGAINING, supra note 51, at 185 (not-
ing that Nollan itself is "case in point" that "real estate developers are not the only persons who
are at risk from [exactions] .... If the Coastal Commission had prevailed, the Nollans could not
have picked up their stakes and moved their house to another locale.").
171 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 159, at 30.
172 See, e.g., V. David Sartin, Recount on Project Likely; Mayor Loses, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Nov. 5, 2003, at Al (discussing the narrow defeat of a proposal to raze an entire neigh-
borhood in an aging suburb to make way for an upscale retail project, and noting that a D.C.
public-interest law firm had "made the project a centerpiece in a campaign against the use of
eminent domain for private development"); Tom Barnes, Fifth-Forbes Foes Express Relief in
Party Atmosphere, PI-rSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 25, 2000, at A13; see also David Nitkin,
Series of Missteps Brought About Demise of Condemnation Bill, SUN (Bait. Md.), Nov. 9,2000, at
Al (discussing successful public relations campaign to defeat a Baltimore County redevelopment
plan); Conor O'Clery, People Power Wins Victory over Might of World Furniture Giant-Over-
whelmed by Fierce Opposition, IKEA Scrapped Plans for 17-Acre Superstore, IRISH TIMES, Feb.
9, 2001, at 53 (detailing demise of New Rochelle, NY plan to condemn neighborhood for IKEA
furniture store). But see, e.g., Tom Barnes, Fifth and Forbes: Fears of Eminent Domain Bring
D.C. Law Firm Back, PIYISBUROH POST-GAZETTE, March 9, 2002, at C-5 (discussing City's ef-
fort to revive plan).
173 Sunstein, supra note 9, at 878.
174 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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True, judicial efforts to uncover whether legislation enacted for the as-
serted "purpose of protecting the public health or welfare, [was], in reality,
passed from other motives,"'175 especially to benefit special interests, is often
cited as a discredited hallmark of Lochner-era jurisprudence.1 76 But, leaving
aside the vigorous debate over whether Nollan and Dolan inappropriately
resuscitate Lochneresque scrutiny, 177 the need to ensure that condemned
property will in fact be used as the government promises is at least as acute in
the public-use context as in the exactions context. Judicial deference to a
decision to exercise the eminent-domain power is predicated on the assump-
tion that the elected branches of government are in a better position than the
courts to determine what uses of land are in the "public interest," and, more-
over, that the elected branches are more accountable than the judiciary re-
gardless of whether their decisions are substantively good or bad.178
175 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
176 Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on
Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605, 622-24 (1996) [hereinafter McUsic, Ghost] (Loch-
ner-era courts sought to uncover and invalidate redistributive "class" legislation); Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 878 (Lochner's means-ends scrutiny used to "flush out" impermissible ends, especially
"raw interest group politics").
177 This debate has been ably waged elsewhere, beginning, fittingly, with the Justices them-
selves. Compare Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(warning that "[e]ven more consequential than its incorrect disposition of this case ... is the
Court's resurrection of a species of substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected de-
cades ago"), with id. at 384 n.5 (rejecting dissent's suggestion that "this case is actually grounded
in 'substantive' due process"); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Court has resorted to a legal standard that has been "discredited for the better part of this
century"), with id. at 834 n.3 (rejecting Brennan's characterization). Academics have also
weighed in on the debate. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 5 (1990) (modern takings doctrine threatens to revive Lochner); Douglas W. Kmiec, The
Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1630, 1650-52 (1988) (wrong to characterize Nollan's nexus test as return to Lochner); Lunney,
Critical Reexamination, supra note 100, at 1896 (1992) ("[T]he Court's approach is either to
ignore precedent or to use name calling-"Lochnerism"); McUsic, Ghost, supra note 176, at 631
("The modern Court also adopts the Lochner era's approach by analyzing the proper nexus
between the owner, the regulation, and the public goal."); Merrill, Rights as Public Goods, supra
note 54, at 865 (noting Justice Steven's observation in Dolan dissent that "style of review man-
dated by the decision was functionally very similar to, and would operate in the same general
area as, Lochner-style review"); Michelman, Takings, supra note 40, at 1609 (rejecting the sug-
gestion that Nollan is "Lochner redivivus"); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1099
n.133 (1993) ("The only way a court could plausibly determine whether a law was not legiti-
mately harm-preventing would be to engage in precisely the same kind of super-legislative judg-
ments that were the hallmark of Lochner-era cases."); Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause:
A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) (suggesting
that "[t]he decision in Nollan marks the return-with a vengeance-of a strict 'means/ends'
analysis"). Lochner-era courts regularly invalidated economic legislation both because the ends
of the legislation was not within the police power and because the government failed to establish
a close fit between the ends of legislation and the means that the government chose to advance
those ends. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 877 (noting two distinct features of Lochner are
sharp limits on the permissible ends of government action and careful means-ends scrutiny); see
also McUsic, Ghost, supra note 176, at 620-21 (Lochner demanded evaluation of both the ends
of legislation and the determination whether "a legislative act rectified the harm caused by the
plaintiff").
178 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) ("Judicial deference is re-
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If, however, the public-use limitations in the federal and state constitu-
tions place outer limits on the eminent-domain power-as the United States
Supreme Court has insisted with respect to the Fifth Amendment179-the jus-
tification for deference disappears if property will be diverted to a purely
private purpose following condemnation. Yet, under current constitutional
standards in virtually every state and federal court, the government need not
provide any assurances that a given exercise of eminent domain is necessary,
or even related, to any particular policy. So long as some conceivable pur-
pose justifies the exercise of eminent domain, the means by which the gov-
ernment acquires land is essentially beyond scrutiny.1 80 By demanding that a
condemning entity link the means by which and the particular reason for
which it seeks to acquire land, a court may well uncover "ulterior" purposes
for the exercise of eminent domain. Furthermore, as discussed in more detail
below, a condemnation is initiated by pleadings setting forth the purpose for
which the government seeks to acquire land. This stated "purpose" would
enable courts to undertake a means-ends evaluation while avoiding the obvi-
ous pitfalls associated with discerning the true purpose of a government's
action.
I. What Would a Means Test Mean?
Assuming that the acquisition of property by eminent domain raises the
concerns that might justify scrutiny of exactions, it remains necessary to for-
mulate a workable version of means-ends scrutiny for a public-use challenge.
Again, Nollan and Dolan may provide insight into this problem. These cases
require a reviewing court to determine whether an exaction is "roughly pro-
portional" to the impact of the development proposed by the landowner1 81
On its face, this proportionality test would not map easily onto a public-use
challenge. When property is taken by eminent domain, it could be said that
this proportionality is never present because the property owner bears a qual-
itatively different burden than the taxpayers who must pay the compensation;
always present because compensation is paid; or, perhaps, present only if fair-
market-value compensation adequately accounts for all of the losses suffered
by the property owner. 82
The solution to this puzzle may lie with the Court's reason for choosing
the "rough proportionality" formula in Dolan. The Court considered several
different state-court tests for reviewing exactions before concluding that the
quired because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public
purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.").
179 See id. at 241 (defining rationality limits of eminent-domain power). The recent cases
discussed in the Introduction may be the first post-Midkiff federal decisions to find that a gov-
ernment in fact reached those limits. See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445, 445 (7th
Cir. 2002); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
180 As Richard Epstein has observed, the "expression 'conceivable public purpose' suggests
that the court, in its search for a 'rational basis,' can supply a purpose the legislature itself
missed." EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 29, at 162.
181 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96.
182 For an exploration of the final suggestion, see Durham, supra note 61.
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correct federal standard required "the municipality to show a 'reasonable re-
lationship' between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed
development."' 8 3 It expressed concern, however, that the phrase "reasona-
ble relationship" might be confused with traditional rational-basis review and
chose the "rough proportionality" standard as its rough equivalent. 84 The
Court defined the rough proportionality formula as follows: "No precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related in both
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."'' 85
The fact that the government has choices about how to acquire land to
advance the public interest permits courts to conduct a similar review in a
public-use challenge. When the government decides that it needs property to
advance the public interest, it can purchase it on the market, condemn it, or,
in some cases, demand it as an exaction. If the government decides to pro-
ceed with a condemnation, it makes additional choices about how to exercise
the power of eminent domain: How much, and which, land should be con-
demned? Should it avail itself to "quick-take" procedures? If the property is
to be transferred to a private party following the condemnation, should the
government simply delegate its power of eminent domain to the ultimate
beneficiary ex ante? Should that beneficiary be required to guarantee that
the property will be used for the purpose for which it is to be condemned?
Because the government can, and does, make decisions about how to
acquire land, a court reviewing a public-use challenge could require a show-
ing similar to that demanded in an exactions case: Can the government link
the means by which and purpose for which it seeks to acquire land? That is,
can the government demonstrate that a given exercise of eminent domain
was "reasonably necessary" to advance, or "related in nature and extent" to,
the public purpose for which the condemnation power was invoked? This
inquiry would continue to reflect the view that legislators, rather than judges,
should determine what projects are in the public interest. It would reject,
however, the conclusion in Midkiff that a court need only satisfy itself that
"the exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose. ' 186 Instead, the courts would ask the government to make a
colorable showing that an exercise of eminent domain is actually needed to
advance the particular purpose justifying it.
While this review departs front Midkiff, it maps rather easily onto stan-
dard eminent-domain procedures. In fact, established rules governing the
forced taking of private property simplify means-ends analysis by requiring,
ex ante, a statement of the "ends" justifying the condemnation. In most
states, and for all takings by the federal government, eminent domain is a
judicial proceeding.' 87 After satisfying the necessary prerequisites, 188 the
183 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390.
184 Id. at 391.
185 Id.
186 Haw. Hous. Auth v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (emphasis added).
187 6 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.05[1] (3d ed. 2002) (noting
the prevalence of judicial model in states); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 71A (setting forth procedure
for condemnations in federal courts). In several states, takings may be effected administratively,
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condemning entity files an action against the persons whose property it seeks
to take. 189 To do so, the condemning entity must submit pleadings which,
inter alia, describe the land to be taken, and, importantly, set forth the public
use for which it is being taken. 90 The purpose used to justify the taking in
these pleadings, which must be stated with particularity in many states,191
could easily serve as the "ends" portion of the public-use equation, just as the
"impact of the proposed development" is used for rough proportionality re-
view of exactions.192
The fact that the government must already justify every exercise of emi-
nent domain with an ex ante statement of purpose undercuts Midkiff s insis-
tence that a proper respect for the prerogatives of the political branches
requires courts to speculate about conceivable justifications for an exercise of
eminent domain.193 The Court has held that such speculation is inappropri-
ate when the government has articulated the purpose of its policy. In the
equal protection context, the Court has rejected the "conceivability" test
under circumstances present with every exercise of eminent domain-that is,
where the government stated, with particularity, the purpose of its action.
For example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission,194 the
Court considered an equal protection challenge to a county's practice of reas-
sessing property for tax purposes only when title changed hands.1 95 The
Court invalidated the assessment scheme because similarly situated property
owners bore drastically different tax burdens. 196 Three years later, in
Nordlinger v. Hahn,'197 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to
California's Proposition 13, which had a nearly identical effect on property
owners. 98 In distinguishing the cases, the Court relied upon the fact that the
county in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. had asserted that its assessment
scheme was "rationally related to its purpose of assessing properties at true
current value."199 (Which, as a matter of logic, it could not be.) The Court
then implied that, when the government articulates a purpose for its action, it
will be held to it: "The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for pur-
by passing a statute or resolution to take certain designated land and awarding compensation to
the owners. 6 SACKMAN, supra, § 24.04.
188 Such prerequisites include, for example, the requirement in most states that the con-
demnor attempt to purchase the property before instituting a condemnation. 6 SACKMAN, supra
note 187, § 26A.02[1].
189 Id. § 24.05[1].
190 See id. § 26A.02[1] (excerpting state statutes); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(c)(2) (di-
recting that "the complaint [for condemnation of property] shall contain a short and plain state-
ment of ... the use for which the property is to be taken").
191 6 SACKMAN, supra note 187, § 26A.02 [1] nn.5 & 24.
192 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994).
193 The reliance on this statement of purpose is, furthermore, more deferential than the
Nollan/Dolan standard, which limits the universe of legitimate governmental justifications for
exactions to one-the mitigation of "the impact of the proposed development." Id. at 395-96.
194 Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
195 Id. at 337.
196 Id. at 341.
197 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
198 Id. at 17.
199 Id. at 15.
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poses of rational-basis review that a . . . governing decisionmaker actually
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.
... [But] this Court's review does require that a purpose may conceivably or
may reasonably have been the [decisionmaker's] purpose and policy. °200 The
Court cited as authority for this proposition Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glan-
der,20 observing that "after the Court in Wheeling Steel determined that the
statutory scheme's stated purpose was not legitimate, the other purposes did
not need to be considered because '[h]aving themselves specifically declared
their purpose, the ... statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose
for their existence.' "202
Of course, a court evaluating a pubic use challenge must still connect the
dots to determine whether a given exercise of eminent domain is reasonably
necessary to advance the purpose used to justify it. This is, to be sure, no
small task. Courts, however, must regularly evaluate the "reasonableness" of
government action. (Consider, for example, the "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause" determinations required in the Fourth Amendment con-
text.) And, determining the "reasonable necessity" of an exercise of eminent
domain certainly is no more difficult than comparing an exaction to the im-
pact of a proposed development. Over time, lower courts undoubtedly will
develop standards to guide means-ends review in public-use cases, just as ju-
dicial standards are beginning to emerge to gauge the proportionality of an
exaction. 203
For example, it is possible that courts might come to ask the government
to make several different types of "necessity" showings. First, at the broadest
level, a court might review whether the larger project for which property is
being condemned is reasonably necessary to advance the government's policy
goals. For example, a court might ask whether a redevelopment project to be
enabled by eminent domain is reasonably necessary to stem the tide of subur-
ban sprawl, to renew a lifeless downtown, or to advance whatever goal the
government uses to justify the exercise of eminent domain. The difficulty is
that this approach comes perilously close to an ends-oriented inquiry. The
distinction between-"is this policy goal (e.g., economic development) in the
public interest?"-and-"is this particular project reasonably necessary to
promote economic development?"-may be real. But, entertaining such a
distinction may prove an exercise in casuistry that intervention-wary courts
are simply unwilling to undertake.
Alternatively, a reasonable necessity test might require courts to ask a
means-ends question familiar from other areas of constitutional law-that is,
200 Id.
201 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
202 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 16 n.7 (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 530 (1959)).
203 For cases applying the "rough proportionality" formula, see, for example, McClure v.
City of Springfield, 28 P.3d 1222, 1228 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding street and sidewalk dedi-
cation requirements); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 49 P.3d 860, 865 (Wash.
2002) (city failed to establish rough proportionality between street improvement conditions and
impact of development); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 71 S.W.3d 18, 44
(Tex. App. 2002) (same); Isla Verde Int'l Holdings v. City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429, 431 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (invalidating city's open space set-aside ordinance under Dolan formula).
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whether the government's actions are "overinclusive" (or, at least theoreti-
cally, "underinclusive").204 In other words, a court seeking to determine
whether a condemnation is "related in nature and extent" to the public pur-
pose justifying it might inquire whether the government is acquiring more
land than necessary or whether the government needs the particular parcel of
land at issue. That is a clear purport of Dolan; the Court invalidated the
exaction because the government failed to demonstrate that it could not ac-
complish its policy objectives with less land.205 In fact, some state courts al-
ready entertain such challenges, permitting property owners to argue that the
size of the taking is excessive.20 6 In most cases, however, continued judicial
deference to the ends of the government's action will minimize the scope of
the inquiry. The power of the government to define the "public interest"
justifying a condemnation necessarily carries with it significant latitude to de-
termine the amount of land needed to advance that interest.
Finally, aside from scrutiny of the amount of land acquired, means-ends
scrutiny in a public-use case might entail an evaluation of whether the gov-
ernment could have acquired the land in question through other, noncoer-
cive, means. Such a requirement might work much like Merrill's "basic
model" of means review.207 Merrill would permit the use of eminent domain
where, "market exchange, if not impossible to achieve, is nevertheless subject
to imperfections. 20 8 To satisfy this burden, the government might show that
it attempted to negotiate with the property owner about a reasonable price
for the land and that its offer was rebuffed, making a resort to eminent do-
main reasonably necessary to eliminate holdouts that impede the public pro-
ject.2°9 Alternatively, the government could present evidence that it chose to
acquire the land through eminent domain rather than through privately ne-
gotiated transfers because, given the facts of the particular project, the
probability that individual property owners would engage in rent-seeking be-
havior is high.210
Consider, for example, the salutary role that heightened means-ends
scrutiny could have played in a recent federal case. In 99 Cents Only Stores v.
Lancaster Redevelopment Authority, a district court did what many had come
204 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 50-51, 58 (1993) (characterizing ban on
signs in residential neighborhoods as both overinclusive and underinclusive, and ultimately in-
validating based on overinclusiveness).
205 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (noting that the applicable regulations
already required Dolan to maintain 15% of her land as open space and that "[t]he city has never
said why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood
control").
206 See 7 JULIus L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.07[3][c][iii] (3d ed. 2002)
(discussing the "excessive taking" defense to condemnation).
207 See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 74-81.
208 Id. at 74-75.
209 See Merrill, Rent Seeking, supra note 9, at 1570 (eminent domain to overcome holdouts
is often necessary to achieve efficient use of resources).
210 Permitting a public-use defendant to argue "we asked and were rejected" minimizes a
serious practical difficulty with Merrill's "basic model"-the fact that it would require a court to
evaluate market conditions to determine whether a high potential for inefficient rent-seeking
behavior, especially that which impedes land assembly, exists. Merrill, Economics of Public Use,
supra note 17, at 74-81.
20031
The George Washington Law Review
to believe was undoable: it held that an exercise of the power of eminent
domain ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment's public-use limitation.21' The
Lancaster Redevelopment Authority ("Authority") sought to condemn prop-
erty leased by the plaintiff in order to accommodate the expansion demands
of the discount retailer, Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco"). 212 Both
stores were located in a shopping center known as "The Power Center,"
which the court characterized as the "highest quality commercial retail prop-
erty in Lancaster. ' 213 Although a recent comprehensive study had found that
Costco's expansion needs would be better met by a vacant parcel of land,
Costco demanded that the Authority condemn the space occupied by 99
Cents Only.2 14 "Fearful of Costco's relocation to another city," the Authority
relented.2 1 5 The Authority agreed to acquire the 99 Cents Only property
from its landlord through a "'friendly' eminent domain proceeding," in which
the city would purchase the property for $3.8 million, relocate 99 Cents Only,
and sell the property to Costco for $1.00.216
The district court rejected the assertion that the condemnation advanced
the Authority's goal of preventing the "reestablishment of blight," finding
that justification "palpably without reasonable foundation" and thus invalid
even under Midkiff s lax standards. 217 In order to reach this conclusion, how-
ever, the court was forced to engage in the very type of judicial second guess-
ing rejected in Midkiff by holding that the city's asserted public purpose-the
prevention of future blight-was pretextual.218 Had the court instead re-
quired Lancaster to demonstrate a connection between the means by which
and the ends for which it acquired the property, the court need not have
rejected the city's assertion that the "avoidance of future blight" was in fact a
valid public purpose.219 Instead, the court might have asked more narrow
questions: Was it reasonably necessary to condemn this land to avoid future
blight? Was it reasonably necessary to concede to Costco's demand for this
particular parcel of land to avoid future blight?
Only time will tell how "rough proportionality" review will play out in
exactions cases, but it is likely that many exactions will pass muster.220 The
211 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Auth., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131
(C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
212 Id. at 1129.




217 Id. at 1129-30.
218 Id. at 1129 ("In short, the very reason that Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents'
leasehold interest was to appease Costco. Such conduct amounts to an unconstitutional taking
for purely private purposes.").
219 Id. at 1131.
220 The government presumably will have little difficulty proving, for example, that street
dedication requirements are "related in both nature and extent" to the impact of a new subdivi-
sion. Early evidence in fact suggested that both Nollan and Dolan had little effect on exactions
demanded by local governments and that state-court opinions continued to reflect substantial
deference toward regulatory agencies. See Dana, supra note 18, at 1287 (reviewing early evi-
dence); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory
Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
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same goes for the "reasonable necessity" evaluation of eminent domain out-
lined above. In many cases, eminent domain may in fact be "reasonably nec-
essary" to enable government policy. The government usually seeks to
purchase property on the market before resorting to eminent domain; and, in
many contexts, is required to do so by law.2 2 1 Even where not legally obli-
gated to bargain with property owners, the government has every incentive
to do so in order to avoid the high "due process costs" that attend an exercise
of eminent domain. 222 (Of course, a reasonable necessity inquiry presumably
would allow the finder of fact to evaluate whether an offer was made in good
faith, rather than a "low ball" offer designed to bypass means-ends review.)
Finally, as Merrill and others have observed, when the government does
choose to exercise the power of eminent domain, it frequently does so in
"thin market" settings where the prospect for holdouts is high.223
Because exercises of eminent domain will generally be upheld, means-
ends review in public-use cases will not cure all of the ills that attend forced
property acquisitions. A reasonable necessity test might not, for example,
prevent the City of Pittsburgh from using its eminent-domain power to elimi-
nate holdouts standing in the way of the "Fifth and Forbes" project 224 even if
the development will be a total flop, ruining the proprietors of the displaced
businesses, and resulting in the destruction of irreplaceable historical build-
ings.225 The fact that means-ends review is not a panacea, however, does not
render it pointless. A reasonable necessity standard would place structural
limits on the power of eminent domain while minimizing the federalism, sep-
aration of powers, and institutional competency perils inherent in the tradi-
tional public-use invitation to question whether the ends of government
action are "public" enough. It would give courts the opportunity to demand
a factual justification for subsidized land transfers like those at issue in the 99
Cents Only case,2 26 which likely strike many as outrageous. For example, the
condemnation proceeding in 99 Cents Only could prove difficult to justify in
L.J. 523, 555 (1995) (noting that "research indicates that landowners have not been successful at
using the state courts to limit restrictive regulation"). More recent cases may call this early
assumption into question. See, e.g., supra note 203.
221 See 6 SACKMAN, supra note 187, § 26A.02[1].
222 See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 77-80 (arguing that the "'due
process' costs of eminent domain-obtaining legislative authority, drafting and filing the com-
plaint, serving process, securing a formal appraisal, and so forth"-make eminent domain more
expensive than market transfers in "thick market" settings); see also FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 74.
223 See FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 68-69, 75-77; Merrill, Econom-
ics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 74-75, 97-98 (reviewing 308 public-use cases and finding over
ninety percent arose in thin market settings). But see Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of
Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 475 (1976) (arguing that the use of eminent domain to
overcome impediments to land assembly is rarely, if ever, advisable); but cf. FISCHEL, REGULA-
TORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 69 (noting that "Munch's study is often cited, but it has not
been replicated").
224 See supra note 7 for description of the project.
225 Of course, a rule precluding inefficient and unwise government projects would have
significantly more bite. But, such a rule is out of the question so long as the courts continue to
avoid making judgment calls about the ends of government policy.
226 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129
(C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
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light of the fact that it was a "friendly" one (i.e., the owner of the property,
Burnham Pacific, agreed to cooperate).22 7
Finally, and importantly, by requiring the government to justify how it
chooses to acquire property, a reasonable necessity test likely would limit the
government's ability to resort to a number of relatively commonplace emi-
nent-domain "shortcuts," each of which amplifies the concerns discussed in
the first half of this Article. Requiring the government to explain why it
chose one of the shortcuts discussed below would enable courts to protect
property owners from eminent-domain abuses while preserving the right of
political actors to condemn land needed to advance their policy goals.
A. Short Cut #1: Quick-Take
The federal government and most states have adopted "quick-take" emi-
nent-domain statutes which permit the government to obtain title and posses-
sion to property prior to a final judgment in an eminent-domain action.228
Governments usually justify quick-take procedures by something akin to the
Fourth Amendment doctrine of "exigent circumstances"-that the delay at-
tendant to a condemnation proceeding would jeopardize the government's
actions.22 9 For example, the leading eminent-domain treatise states that
quick-take statutes were enacted after "urgent public transportation, commu-
nication and urban renewal projects ... illustrated the many inadequacies in
the traditional [eminent domain] procedures. '230
Quick-take procedures are potentially problematic for a number of the
reasons addressed above. First, the literature on the "dignitary value" of due
process suggests that the lack of a predeprivation opportunity to litigate the
legitimacy of a condemnation may impose additional uncompensated losses
on property owners.23' This literature-and much of the due process ca-
non-assumes that "the right to be heard" prior to an adverse government
action is itself intrinsically valuable.2 32 The Court's decisions permitting
postdeprivation procedures in certain narrow circumstances accept this fact,
227 Id. at 1126.
228 See Declaration of Taking Act, ch. 307, 46 Stat. 1421 (1931) (codified as amended at 40
U.S.C. §§ 3114-3116, 3118 (Supp. 2003)); 6 SACKMAN, supra note 187, § 24.10. The standard
quick-take procedure requires the condemnor to file a "declaration of taking" and to deposit the
appraised fair market value of the property with the court. Id.
229 On the exigent circumstances exception, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94
(1978) (noting that "warrants are generally required ... unless the 'exigencies of the situation'
make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment").
230 6 SACKMAN, supra note 187, § 24.10[2].
231 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and the "Progress of the Law," 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 19-20 (1988) (arguing that posttermination hearing may not adequately
protect dignitary interests); Frank 1. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees:
The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part One, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172 (identifying, among
purposes of hearing requirement, "dignity values" including "concern for the humiliation or loss
of self-respect which a person might suffer if denied an opportunity to litigate," and "participa-
tion values," such as "an appreciation of litigation as one of the modes in which persons exert
influence, or have their wills 'counted"'). See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 222-53 (1985).
232 See Brennan, supra note 231; Michelman, supra note 231; MASHAW, supra note 231.
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but proceed on the assumption that an aggrieved individual can be made
whole post hoc. 233 If fair-market-value monetary compensation fails to make
an aggrieved property owner whole, a law that enables the government to
condemn real property without a prior determination that it has the legal
right to do so is particularly problematic. In many cases, a postcondemnation
challenge to the legality of a taking may deny property owners a realistic
opportunity to secure the only remedy that will fully compensate them: the
continued right to possess their property as it is. If the government avails
itself to quick-take procedures, a postdeprivation determination that its ac-
tions were illegal may come too late. After all, quick-take procedures are
justified by the government's need to secure land quickly in order to change
it quickly. By the time the propriety of a quick taking is litigated, the prop-
erty may have been inalterably changed.
Second, quick-take procedures may reduce the administrative costs asso-
ciated with a condemnation, eroding any deterrent effect that such costs have
on the government's acquisition of property. The available empirical evi-
dence suggests that increased compensation requirements limit the exercise
of the condemnation power.234 It is reasonable to assume that higher admin-
istrative costs will have a similar deterrent effect.235
And, third, the "quickness" of a quick-take procedure may preclude the
effective exercise of "voice" by affected property owners and their sympa-
thizers. An assumption underlying Midkiff is that the political process-
rather than the judiciary-is better able to determine when an exercise of
eminent domain serves the public interest.236 William Fischel has gone far-
ther, arguing that "[t]he cases that flirt with the borderlines of public use,
such as Poletown, are also limited by popular revulsion at the government's
action. 2 37 Of course, the possibility that public outcry will actually curb emi-
nent-domain abuse decreases dramatically as the condemnation time line
constricts. This was one of many of the "bad faith" allegations launched
against the city of Detroit during the Poletown controversy. Justice Ryan, in
dissent, angrily complained: "[T]he city, aided by the Michigan 'quick-take'
statute, marshalled and applied its resources to insure that [the condemna-
tion plan] was a fait accompli before meaningful objection could be regis-
233 See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) ("Moreover, the State ... has pro-
vided respondent with the means by which he can receive redress for the deprivation.").
234 See FiSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 96 (discussing evidence support-
ing deterrent effect of compensation); Joseph J. Cordes and Burton A. Weisbrod, Government
Behavior in Response to Compensation Requirements, 11 J. PUB. ECON. 51-59 (1979) (finding
that increased compensation deterred highway development).
235 See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 77 (discussing deterrent effect of
administrative costs associated with condemnation); see also Joseph A. Cordes & Burton A.
Weisbrod, When Government Programs Create Inequities: A Guide to Compensation Policies, 4 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 178 (1985) (discussing administrative costs of implementing compen-
sation requirement and suggesting such costs might lead administrators to choose "implicit"
compensation, such as postponing public projects).
236 See Haw. Hous. Auth. V. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) ("Judicial deference is re-
quired because, in our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public
purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power.").
237 FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 74.
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tered or informed opposition organized. '238 When a condemnation proceeds
"quickly," a public protest may come too late to prevent the losses. Professor
Fischel may be right that the public outcry resulting from the Poletown fiasco
ensures that "in the future Detroit or any other city will think hard before it
razes an established neighborhood for the benefit of a large corporation. 2 39
Unfortunately, he also is right that this future deterrence "is small comfort
for the Poletown residents who were actually displaced,"2 40 and who, it might
be added, were deprived by the quick-take proceeding of a chance to organ-
ize an effective political resistance.
All of that said, any constitutional challenge to quick-take procedures
must contend with a long line of cases that approve of them in principle. In
the 1890 case Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.,24 1 the Court
upheld a federal statute that authorized the defendant to enter into tribal
lands for the purpose of constructing a railroad. 242 The Court rejected the
Cherokee Nation's argument that the law violated the Takings Clause be-
cause it did not require the railroad to provide compensation before occupy-
ing the land and beginning construction. 243 The Court observed that "[tihe
Constitution declares that private property shall not be taken for 'public use
without just compensation.' It does not provide or require that compensa-
tion shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be
taken. '244 The Court has reaffirmed this holding on several subsequent occa-
sions.2 45 The principle underlying these decisions also is reflected in the
Court's more recent decisions holding that adequate postdeprivation reme-
dies may obviate the need for a preseizure hearing in the procedural due
process context.246
The Court has never directly addressed the issue whether quick take
might unconstitutionally deprive a property owner of the opportunity to a
predeprivation determination on the public-use question 2 47-a position
238 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 470 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
239 FiSCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 74-75.
240 Id. at 74.
241 Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Railway Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
242 Id. at 659.
243 Id. at 658-59.
244 Id. at 659. The Court went on to observe that the "owner is entitled to reasonable,
certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is disturbed."
Id.
245 See Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 62 (1919); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 400-01
(1895).
246 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930-35 (1997) (holding that sufficiently
prompt postsuspension hearing satisfied due process where tenured employee was suspended
without hearing after being charged with drug felonies); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 435-37 (1982) (declining to extend Parratt although recognizing validity of principle
that postdeprivation hearing may satisfy due process in some cases); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 538-43 (1981) (holding that where prisoner was deprived of property due to unauthorized
failure of state agent to follow proper procedures rather than inadequacy of procedure itself,
postdeprivation process leading to compensation satisfied due process).
247 See Bragg, 251 U.S. at 58 ("It is conceded that the taking is under the direction of public
officers and is for a public use.").
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adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court.2 48 Given the small probability of
an erroneous deprivation on this ground,249 however, it is unlikely that the
Court would find a per se federal impediment to the acquisition of property
through quick-take eminent-domain procedures.
The fact that quick-take procedures are not unconstitutional on their
face, however, does not mean that they are constitutional in all of their appli-
cations. On the contrary, the Court has expressed a strong preference for "as
applied" challenges to the constitutionality of a law.2 5 0 The cases discussed
above would not, therefore, preclude courts from interpreting the public-use
limitation to require the government to demonstrate why it was necessary to
resort to them in any given case. On the contrary, limiting quick-take emi-
nent domain to cases where it is needed would be consistent with the proce-
dural due process principle that "[i]n situations where the State feasibly can
provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do
so regardless of the adequacy of the postdeprivation hearing to compensate
for the taking. '251 Furthermore, in a situation analogous to the taking of
property by eminent domain, the Supreme Court invalidated on due process
grounds state laws permitting the replevin of personal property prior to a
preconfiscation hearing.252 Thus far, however, lower courts have rejected ef-
forts to extend this rule to invalidate quick-take eminent-domain
procedures.253
A reasonable necessity requirement also would not be out of step with
laws governing quick-take eminent domain in some states. Although the
Mississippi case appears to be an outlier, other states require, either by stat-
ute or judicial decision, some showing of necessity prior to the invocation of
the quick-take powers.2 5 4 The justifications offered for resorting to a quick-
248 Lemon v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 735 So. 2d 1013, 1023 (Miss. 1999) (holding that state
quick-take procedures fail to provide "a predeprivation opportunity for the landowner to chal-
lenge the taking and make the condemnor satisfy its burden on the issue of public use").
249 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (including among factors to be con-
sidered to evaluate whether procedure is constitutionally deficient "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation").
250 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the chal-
lenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.
The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set
of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid .... ).
251 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990); see also Parratt, 541 U.S. at 541 (rejecting
demand for predeprivation hearing because "it is difficult to conceive of how the State could
provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place").
252 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
253 See Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d 1312, 1322 (4th
Cir. 1983); Vazza v. Campbell, 520 F.2d 848, 850 (1st Cir. 1975); Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F.
Supp. 754, 772-73 (N.D. Tex. 1974), affd, 419 U.S. 1042 (1974).
254 See, e.g., State v. Barbara's Creative Jewelry, Inc., 728 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1998) ("'The
condemning authority initially must come forward with proof that there is a public purpose for
the taking and a reasonable necessity that the land in question is being taken for the contem-
plated public use."' (quoting City of Lakeland v. Bunch, 293 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. 1974))); Dep't of
Transp. v. Sunnyside P'ship, 785 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (Il. App. 2003) (discussing statutory require-
ment that condemnor demonstrate necessity of resort to quick-take eminent domain); City of
Rochester v. People's Coop. Power Ass'n, 483 N.W.2d 477, 480 (Minn. 1992) (noting that "utili-
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take condemnation 'are judicially reviewable. As the Alaska Supreme Court
has observed, "'A decisional document, done carefully and in good faith,
serves several salutary purposes. It facilitates judicial review by demonstrat-
ing those factors which were considered .... It assists interested parties in
determining whether to seek judicial review. And it tends to restrain agen-
cies from acting beyond the bounds of their jurisdiction."' 255 The court went
on to assert, "We think that 'quick take' decisions deserve explanation, and
that the necessary explanations be made in a decisional document filed con-
temporaneously with the declaration of a taking. 2 56 Such requirements, if
applied in public-use cases generally, would serve to channel the use of
quick-take eminent domain to cases where exigency in fact exists. For exam-
ple, a government would likely find it more difficult to justify the need to
resort to quick-take eminent domain to enable a long-term economic devel-
opment effort than to expand a road or sewer. While the latter classic public
improvements might well proceed in a piecemeal fashion (perhaps as funding
becomes available), a new shopping mall or factory presumably would take
months of planning, during which time property owners could be afforded
predeprivation hearings on their condemnations.2 57
B. Short Cut # 2: Delegation
Aside from exercising "quick-take" powers, government agencies some-
times choose to expedite the acquisition of property by empowering a private
party to condemn the land for itself. Such a delegation of eminent-domain
power (including the delegation of quick-take powers) to nongovernmental
entities has a longstanding pedigree.25 8 The Supreme Court, in fact, simulta-
neously rejected a federal constitutional challenge to the delegation of the
power of eminent domain and approved the principle of quick-take in Chero-
kee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.2 59 Given that many of our "pub-
lic utilities" are regulated private companies, the delegation of eminent-
domain powers makes sense in some circumstances. 260 Even when the goal
of an exercise of eminent domain is economic development, the delegation of
zation of the 'quick-take' procedure requires a showing by the condemnor of necessity for ac-
quiring title and possession prior to the filing of the commissioners' award and payment or
deposit with the court of its approved appraisal value").
255 Ship Creek Hydraulic Syndicate v. Alaska, 685 P.2d 715, 717 (Alaska 1984) (quoting
Southeast Ala. Conservation Council, Inc. v. State, 665 P.2d 544, 549 (Alaska 1983)).
256 Id. at 718.
257 See, e.g., STEVEN ELROD, THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN-INTRODUCTION AND
OVERVIEW § 1.35 (Supp. 1998) (observing that "quick-take is intended to be used only when the
immediate use of the property is necessary and the project cannot wait until the procedural
safeguards of traditional condemnation have been satisfied"). For this reason, the use of quick-
take in the redevelopment context remains controversial. Id.
258 See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM THE MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 123-80 (2001) (reviewing 19th century decisions addressing private
property and the power of eminent domain).
259 Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Railway Co., 135 U.S. 641, 656-58 (1890).
260 The private providers of these services may be better situated to determine the place-
ment of sewer and rail lines, telephone poles, and power lines. See, e.g, RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62-63 (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that the need of utility companies to
prevent holdouts in acquisition of land may justify eminent domain).
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eminent-domain powers to a private party with redevelopment expertise is
not always indefensible: a federal law requirement that local governments
assemble land and conceive a redevelopment proposal before soliciting the
participation of private developers has been blamed for some of the failures
of urban renewal.261
For many of the reasons discussed above, however, it is easy to see why
the delegation of the eminent-domain power could be especially demoraliz-
ing for property owners targeted by the private condemner. They may feel
singled out for, using Michelman's words, "capricious redistribution" at the
behest of politically powerful interests who have been given the right to take
their property in order to put it to a "better" use. 262 In addition, the prolifer-
ation of open-meeting and other "sunshine laws '263 suggests that these re-
sentments are likely exacerbated when a de facto delegation results from an
unacknowledged backroom deal with the party standing to benefit from the
condemnation. In this situation, the government, in an act tantamount to a
delegation of the condemnation power, simply agrees to condemn the partic-
ular parcel of property that a private beneficiary desires. For example, in the
99 Cents Only case, the facts clearly revealed that the government sought to
condemn the plaintiff's store because Costco demanded that particular parcel
of property.264
Not surprisingly, therefore, individuals seeking to defeat an exercise of
eminent domain occasionally argue that a de facto delegation itself runs afoul
of the public-use limitation on the takings power. Several such challenges
have succeeded. The National City Environmental case is one example.2 65
There, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the redevelopment authority's
taking was unconstitutional because it was, in essence, "selling" the power of
eminent domain for a profit.2 66 In addition, a Pennsylvania trial court re-
cently stopped a condemnation because it found that the government was
simply acting as the agent for a private developer.267 Other well-publicized
261 Federal law prevented local governments from inviting proposals from developers until
actual demolition was nearly completed. In effect, government officials had to conceive and
plan a projected redevelopment, acquire the necessary land via eminent domain, and then clear
all existing structures from the land before developers could be solicited. The process could be
underway for a great many years before developers could weigh in on the desirability of building
on the proposed land. See, e.g., FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 74, at 43; Lyman Brownfield,
The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 735-40 (1960).
262 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 21., at 1214.
263 On sunshine laws generally, see, for example, Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The
Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173
(1997); David A. Barrett, Note, Facilitating Government Decision Making: Distinguishing Be-
tween Meetings and Nonmeetings Under the Federal Sunshine Act, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1195,
1199-1200 (1988); Teresa Dale Pupillo, Note, The Changing Weather Forecast: Government in the
Sunshine in the 1990s-An Analysis of State Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165, 1165 (1993).
264 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131
(C.D. Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
city condemned the 99 Cents property because "Costco ... demanded that it be allowed to
expand into the space").
265 Southwest Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Il1. 2002).
266 Id. at 8, 11.
267 In re Condemnation of 110 Washington St., 767 A.2d 1154, 1159 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
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but failed efforts to press similar arguments include the famed Poletown deci-
sion, where the dissent complained bitterly about the fact that General Mo-
tors was calling the shots,268 and a more recent New Jersey case involving the
New Jersey Casino Reinvestment Development Authority's efforts to con-
demn a private home and two small businesses that Donald Trump wanted
for a limousine holding lot.2 69
The decision in the abovementioned Pennsylvania case, which Profes-
sors Dana and Merrill recently characterized as a "promising step, 270 re-
quired that a delegation of the power of eminent domain proceed pursuant to
express statutory (as opposed to administrative) authorization, and concluded
that the power of eminent domain "may not be delegated by agreement or
contract."'271 In Daniels, the Seventh Circuit adopted a variant of this ap-
proach.272 There, the court refused to defer to the county's administrative
decision to void a covenant because "the legislature has not made a specific
determination of what constitutes a 'public use' .. . and instead has delegated
that duty to the local Plan Commission. 2 73 The court reasoned that only
statutorily designated "public uses" are entitled to Midkiff deference. 274
This approach has theoretical appeal. While it stops short of rejecting
the longstanding federal rule that the power of eminent domain is delegable,
it also requires the government to make ex ante determinations as to when
delegation is appropriate. Perhaps policymakers' zeal for the magic bullet of
"economic development" would be tempered if they were forced to set forth
clear guidelines defining the circumstances under which delegation is appro-
priate and to pass legislation expressly delegating the power of eminent do-
main to private beneficiaries rather than simply bending to their demands to
condemn land for them. Moreover, the decision to delegate to a private en-
tity the final say over whether and where a condemnation will occur is often
tantamount to a decision to condemn. Thus, at the very least, predelegation
notice and debate of enabling legislation would enhance the effectiveness of
"voice" by enabling opposition to organize and force legislatures to listen to
dissent from within the community before the delegation/condemnation deal
was sealed. 275 Further, public participation itself might dispel resentment
and minimize accusations about the mistreatment of underrepresented inter-
ests in the planning process.
As an application of the Fifth Amendment, however, such an approach
would require federal courts to review the decision-making procedures of
state and local governments to determine who has, and should, make a dele-
268 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 468 (Mich.
1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) ("Behind the frenzy of official activity was the unmistakable guiding
and sustaining, indeed controlling, hand of the General Motors Corporation.").
269 See Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1998).
270 THOMAS W. MERRILL & DAVID A. DANA, PROPERTY: TAKINGS (2002).
271 In re Condemnation of 110 Washington St., 767 A.2d at 1159.
272 Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002).
273 Id. at 460-61.
274 Id. at 460-66.
275 FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 63, at 74 (noting public outcry as a limit on
the power of eminent domain).
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gation decision. Such review would seem to raise significant federalism and
separation of powers concerns. It would also pose practical problems, given
the fact that the legislative, administrative, and adjudicative functions of
many local government entities with the power of eminent domain are not
clearly delineated.2 76 The rule adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Daniels,
questioning a delegation of eminent-domain authority from state to local
government agency, is even more problematic. Not only is a decision of a
county planning commission difficult to classify as "legislative" or "adminis-
trative," but most states permit local governments to contract with other gov-
ernmental entities for their services-including the exercise of eminent-
domain powers. 277
A reasonable necessity test again offers a more narrow approach that
would serve the same purpose as a delegation-by-statute requirement.
Rather than requiring a legislative act of delegation, a court could simply
closely scrutinize the government's decision to delegate. As with quick-take,
a reviewing court might ask the condemning entity to justify its decision to
delegate the power of eminent domain and review whether such a delegation
was in fact "reasonably necessary" to advance the public purpose for which
the land is being condemned. 278 Not only could scrutiny of the decision to
delegate the power of eminent domain minimize the high demoralization
costs associated with delegation, it also might expose and limit the govern-
ment's tendency to respond to rent-seeking on the part of the would-be bene-
ficiaries of a condemnation. Not surprisingly, the available evidence strongly
suggests that private parties standing to benefit from an exercise of eminent
domain frequently exert political pressure on the condemning government.279
While a reasonable necessity requirement would not eliminate such rent
seeking,280 a requirement that the government make such an argument might
serve a "shaming function" that would deter some excesses of eminent
domain.
The Illinois Supreme Court undertook such an analysis in the National
City Environmental case. 281 In that situation, there was no question that the
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority ("Authority") had delegated
the power of eminent domain to a private party. After all, Gateway Interna-
276 Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home? One Person/One Vote and Local Governments,
60 U. CMI. L. REV. 339, 341 (1993) (discussing variations in form of local governments).
277 See VALENTE ET AL., STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 412 (5th ed. 2001) (noting
that forty states specifically authorize intergovernmental cooperation).
278 Perhaps in appropriate cases, for example, a court would permit delegation enabling the
government to enlist a developer early in the planning stages of a project.
279 Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 50, 65-85 (1998) (characterizing well-publi-
cized condemnations cases as "rent-seeking in operation"); see also Merrill, Economics of Public
Use, supra note 17, at 61-63 (reviewing several of the well-publicized condemnation cases).
280 On the contrary, a reasonable necessity requirement might permit the government to
justify an exercise of eminent domain based upon rent seeking. The government could argue, for
example, that the use of eminent domain was reasonably necessary to attract new development.
See Merrill, Economics of Public Use, supra note 17, at 66-67; see also Farber, supra note 67, at
291 (suggesting that scrutiny of eminent domain would deter rent seeking, but acknowledging
the problems identified by Merrill such as judicial legitimacy and competence).
281 Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Il1. 2002).
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tional Motorsports filed an application asking the Authority to condemn a
particular parcel of land in exchange for a commission. 282 It was also clear
that, at least in the abstract, the policy justifying this condemnation-eco-
nomic development-could support an exercise of eminent domain.283 The
court invalidated the condemnation, however, because it found that the gov-
ernment failed to demonstrate that the condemnation-on-demand scheme
was justified by legitimate policy goals:
[The Authority]'s true intentions were not clothed in an indepen-
dent, legitimate governmental decision to further a planned public
use. [The Authority] did not conduct or commission a thorough
study of the parking situation at Gateway. Nor did it formulate any
economic plan requiring additional parking .... It appears [the Au-
thority's] true intentions were to act as a default broker of land for
Gateway's proposed parking plan.
284
Finally, a court might ask the private party exercising (actual or de facto)
delegated eminent-domain powers to demonstrate that its actions were rea-
sonably necessary to advance the public purpose justifying the initial delega-
tion. Such scrutiny might prove fatal in many cases: consider, again, the 99
Cents Only case. 285 If a court were to find that the development authority in
fact delegated the eminent-domain power to Costco, then it would fall upon
Costco to demonstrate that the decision to demand the particular parcel of
land in question (out of all of those available) was reasonably necessary to
"prevent future blight." This would be a particularly difficult burden to meet
in the 99 Cents Only case. Not only did Costco refuse to bargain for the
space, but the available evidence suggested that Costco's expansion needs
would be best served with a different and unoccupied parcel of land. 286
C. Short Cut #3: Failure to Guarantee the Continuation of a Public Use
Finally, and significantly, means-ends scrutiny might require the govern-
ment to take reasonable steps to ensure that the land actually will be used for
the purpose for which it was condemned-at least where a private party is to
be entrusted to carry out that purpose. Such a requirement would be in
keeping with the state legislative trend toward requiring greater accountabil-
ity for development incentives generally. A number of states have consid-
ered or adopted "clawback" legislation penalizing the recipient of
development incentives for failing to follow through on promised investment
or job creation. 287 Others have attempted to assure greater accountability
282 Id. at 4.
283 Id. at 9.
284 Id. at 10.
285 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D.
Cal. 2001), appeal dismissed as moot, 60 Fed. Appx. 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
286 Id. at 1126.
287 See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 138-39
(1995) (describing accountability statutes); Ivan C. Dale, Note, Economic Development Incen-
tives, Accountability Legislation and a Double Negative Commerce Clause, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J.
247, 266-69 (2002) (describing proliferation of accountability legislation).
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contractually. 288 Such measures theoretically give the government the right
to recapture all or part of the costs of its investment if the recipient leaves
prematurely or fails to follow through with promised job creation. 289
Especially when eminent domain is offered as a locational inducement,
the public-use limitation might similarly be interpreted to require the govern-
ment to either reserve "clawback" rights before transferring land acquired by
eminent domain to a private beneficiary or demonstrate why it was necessary
to forgo them. An application of this form of "means" analysis is illustrated
by a recent decision of a New Jersey court. The case concerned the New
Jersey Casino Redevelopment Authority's ("Authority") efforts to condemn
a private home and two small businesses at the behest of Donald Trump, who
sought the land for a limousine holding lot and private green space.290 The
owners of the property slated for condemnation challenged the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing that the Authority was condemning land for a
purely private purpose, in violation of the state and federal constitutions. 29'
The court accepted the Authority's argument that the parking lot, green
space, and additional hotel rooms would serve a public purpose-to assist in
the development of the city's "Corridor Area. '292 Nevertheless, it found that
the agency's exercise of eminent domain was inappropriate. The court rea-
soned that, because "Trump is not bound to use these properties for those
purposes," the condemnation raised the possibility that "a public agency...
will have effectively created an assemblage of land for future development by
Trump." 293
288 See Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's Erod-
ing Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1819-30 (1993) (discussing use of contract claims to stop
plant closings); Moss, supra note 287, at 151 (discussing accountability contracts); see also ARIz.
REV. STAT. § 41-1505.07 (1999) (requiring companies to submit a "memorandum of understand-
ing" that contains performance standards and provides for readjustment or recapture of subsidy
if recipient fails to meet standards); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-4104, 77-4107 (2001) (requiring
memorandum of understanding providing for recapture of subsidy for any business that fails to
meet goals within six years).
289 See Moss, supra note 287, at 138-43 (describing statutory and contractual accountability
measures); Lawrence W. Reed, Time to End the Economic War Among the States, REGULATION,
Spring 2002 (discussing Louisiana, Ohio and Texas clawback laws); see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 45.81.040 (Michie 2002) (mandating repayment of new business incentive grant); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 15-4-1606 (Michie 2001) (incentives terminated if number of full-time employees drops
below agreed-upon levels); IOWA CODE § 15E.193(3) (2000) (business receiving subsidy under
state enterprise zone law subject to repayment if it fails to meet obligations); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:2457 (West 2003) (terminating incentives if recipient's payroll does not exceed $1
million); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.601 (2002) (requiring any business that received a subsidy to
locate in a specific place to repay the incentive if it relocates); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-45B-8
(Michie 1996) (withholding ten percent of subsidy until project is completed and investment
projections are met); Wis. STAT. § 66.1103 (2003) (requiring "job projection estimates" before a
municipality can agree to publicly financed projects).
290 Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1998); see also David M. Herzenhorn, Widowed Homeowner Foils Trump Bid in Atlantic City,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1998, at B1; Laura Mansnserus, What Public? Whose Use? In Casino
Shadows, Testing Limits of Land-Seizure Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, at 14-1.
291 Banin, 727 A.2d at 103.
292 Id. at 104-05.
293 Id. at 110.
The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 71:934
In the typical public-use challenge, the government might employ a
number of standard private land use controls to satisfy a future assurances
requirement. Obviously, if a private party received an unencumbered fee
simple title to condemned land, it is free to change the use of the land at any
time. To avoid this problem, a condemnor might encumber the title to the
condemned land with a restrictive covenant requiring that the land be used
for its intended purpose for some reasonable period of time.2 94 If the prop-
erty ceased to be used as designated,2 95 the government could, in most states,
secure an injunction enforcing the requirement.2 96 Furthermore, the require-
ment would "run with the land"-that is, bind subsequent owners297-
thereby preventing the party receiving title to the condemned land from
reaping a windfall through a subsequent sale.2 98
The government might instead choose, perhaps to avoid concerns about
the practical and legal difficulties posed by enforcement of such a covenant,
to convey less than a full fee simple interest in the condemned property.299
294 For example, the agreement between Trump and the Casino Redevelopment Authority
included a restrictive covenant requiring Trump to use the property "for a hotel development
project." Id. at 108. The court found that this requirement was not stated with sufficient speci-
ficity to satisfy the relevant statutory standards. Id. at 110-11.
295 In most cases, restrictive covenants benefit a particular parcel of land, known as the
"dominant estate." See JOSEPH W. SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 6.1 (2001). The
"benefit" of the covenant is enjoyed by subsequent owners of the dominant estate, just as the
"burden" of the covenant is borne by subsequent owners of the encumbered land, or "servient
estate." Id. If the benefit of the covenant is not tied to ownership of any particular parcel of
land-as would be the case if it was held by the government-the covenant is said to be "in
gross." Id. § 6.3.2. Because the benefit of a covenant encumbering condemned land would be,
in most cases, "in gross," the government could not, in some states, validly transfer the right to
enforce it to a third party. Id.
296 Theoretically, the requirement that a restrictive covenant "touch and concern" the land
could prevent the government from using the device to ensure that condemned property contin-
ues to be used as intended. The practical meaning of this requirement is quite amorphous;
courts have suggested variously that a covenant "touches and concerns" the land if it limits the
use or enjoyment of the land, or, more broadly, affects the market value of the land. Most
restrictive covenants are negative covenants, which invariably satisfy the touch and concern re-
quirement because they prohibit certain land uses. A covenant that a landowner continue to use
land for a certain purpose (e.g., the purpose for which it was condemned), however, would likely
be considered an "affirmative covenant." Traditionally, affirmative covenants did not satisfy the
touch and concern requirement and did not "run with the land" and therefore did not bind
subsequent owners. (In this situation, the agreement between the original parties would be en-
forceable as a contract.) Although the clear trend is toward abandoning this traditional rule,
some courts continue to express hesitancy about enforcing covenants that require subsequent
owners to continue particular uses of property. On the "touch and concern requirement," see
Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
890-98 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1358-64 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SERVITUDES § 3.2
(2000) (eliminating the "touch and concern" requirement). A negative covenant requiring that
the property owner use the land for no purpose except that for which it was condemned would
"touch and concern the land." It would not, however, guarantee that the land was in fact used
for that purpose; the owner could comply with the restriction by doing nothing with it. See
generally SINGER, supra note 295, § 6.3.
297 SINGER, supra note 295, § 6.1
298 See id. § 6.3 (discussing cases dealing with enforcement of covenants).
299 See supra note 296 (addressing validity of affirmative covenants).
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For example, the government might convey a fee simple determinable that
would terminate, with title passing automatically back to the government, 300
if the property ceased to be used for its intended public purpose. Less drastic
alternatives, including the retention either of a right to entry giving the gov-
ernment the option of terminating the estate 30 1 or an option to repurchase
the property if the public use is abandoned, presumably would also satisfy the
constitutional requirement. The government might permit the condemnee to
retain the future interest created by the conveyance of less than a full fee
simple, providing that, upon abandonment of the public use, title to the prop-
erty reverts back to the former owner (as is almost always the case upon
abandonment of an easement) or the former owner is permitted to repur-
chase the property (as is the case in five states already). 30 2 Finally, the gov-
ernment might retain title to the land but enter into a long term lease
providing that the private party use the land for the intended public purpose.
Under these circumstances, the abandonment of the public purpose would be
considered a material breach and grounds for termination of the lease.
Arguably, a future assurances requirement runs counter to the well-es-
tablished principle that once the government has condemned land for a valid
public purpose, it is free to change the use of the land at a later date.30 3
Presumably, if the condemnor is free to change the use of condemned land at
any time, it need not encumber the land to guarantee the public use for which
the land was condemned will continue. On the other hand, when the public
use is to be carried out by a private party, a future-assurances requirement
simply could be seen as a guarantee that the property is in fact being con-
demned for the reason given by the government. (The latter position was
taken by the court in the Trump case.)
In any event, concerns about undermining the traditional presumption
that public uses may be abandoned could be addressed by permitting the
government to demonstrate that the transfer of an unencumbered fee simple
was a necessity given the circumstances. The reasonable necessity hurdle
likely will be highest, however, when the government wishes to transfer con-
demned property to a private beneficiary as an unencumbered fee simple.
Such a transfer implicitly suggests that the private beneficiary's intentions are
not altogether pure-that its purpose for seeking the land may be something
300 In this case, the government would hold a possibility of reverter.
301 Such a conveyance would create a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
302 See R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (providing that the condemnee has the first right to
purchase or lease any "remainder"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 416.670(1) (Banks-Baldwin 2002)
(providing that condemnor must offer property to condemnee at condemnation price if develop-
ment is not commenced within eight years); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-39-321(1) (2002) (providing
for public auction of condemned property upon abandonment of the public use); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 498-A:12(I) (1997) (providing condemnor must offer property to condemnee at
the condemnation value if it has been substantially improved and is sold within ten years of the
condemnation); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 406 (A) (McKinney 2003) (providing that, within
first ten years of acquisition, condemnor must give former property owner a right of first refusal
to purchase property at fair market value if public use is abandoned and property sold); see also
Kevin L. Cooney, Note, A Profit for the Taking: Sale of Condemned Property After Abandon-
ment of the Proposed Public Use, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 751, 757 n.38 (1996) (citing statutes).
303 See, e.g., United States v. 125.2 Acres of Land, 732 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1984); Higgin-
son v. United States, 384 F.2d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 1967).
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other than the "public" one that purportedly supports the condemnation. 304
In an outlier case, however, the Court might accept an argument that the
future assurances requirement prevents the government from attracting rep-
utable private investors to participate in a project with a high risk of
failure. 305
Conclusion
The prevailing legal wisdom holds that monetary compensation mini-
mizes the need for judicial review of an exercise of eminent domain. This
Article questions that assumption. A forcible taking of property for fair-mar-
ket-value compensation raises many of the same concerns as a demand that
an owner voluntarily exchange property rights for regulatory approval. By
definition, an exercise of eminent domain "singles out" an individual to bear
the burden of a government policy (wise or unwise)-a burden for which the
owner may not be fully compensated. In light of this reality, this Article
suggests that means-ends scrutiny in public-use cases is as justified (or more
justified) than the scrutiny now required of exactions.
Means-ends scrutiny will necessarily be a less-than-complete antidote to
the ills that may attend eminent domain. Requiring a relatively tight connec-
tion between an exercise of eminent domain and the public policy justifying it
will put the government "to its proof," so to speak. So long as courts con-
tinue to refuse to second guess the ends of government action, however,
means-ends review will provide only a limited, but important, structural con-
straint on the power of eminent domain. Just as political restraint, rather
than judicial intervention, is necessary to limit most regulatory excesses, the
political branches rather than the judiciary must provide the front-line de-
fense against a temptation to overuse the eminent-domain power. By requir-
ing the government to link the means and ends of an exercise of eminent
domain, courts would place important structural limitations on the power of
eminent domain while respecting the prerogative of the political branches to
determine what policy ends are in the public interest.
304 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 878 (noting that means-ends review operates to
"flush out" such pretext).
305 Local governments routinely encumbered land condemned for urban renewal for up to
fifty years by retaining a right of reverter and inserting multiple covenants on the deed prior to
transferring it to private developers. See Eugene B. Jacobs, Land Drafting Problems in Redevel-
opment and Urban Renewal Projects, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373, 377-78 (1970) (describ-
ing standard redevelopment agreement). These encumbrances have been cited as a contributing
factor to the program's failures. See, e.g., Lyman Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban
Renewal, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 754-57 (1960) (criticizing right of reverter clauses as
heavy-handed and inflexible).
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